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Abstract 
This project investigates Bolivia’s possibilities of achieving economic growth through mining 
while simultaneously protecting the rights of the indigenous populations and the 
environment. Firstly, a discourse analysis maps the inherent contradictions of president Evo 
Morales and the Bolivian government’s rhetorical presentation of a holistic development 
model, which encompasses both an extractivist approach as well as an assertion of 
indigenous’ and natures’ rights, through the Andean ideology of Vivir bien. A theoretical 
framework of citizenship, community and inclusion is applied. This is followed by a paired-
comparison analysis of two cases; the foreign and privately owned mining operation, San 
Cristóbal, and the state-owned project of lithium extraction. The concepts derived from the 
discourse analysis are applied to the two cases by using three analytical parameters; 
Contribution to economic development, Environmental impact, and Inclusion, consultation and 
indigenous rights. Conclusively, based on the case-analyses, the project discusses the 
inevitability of a trade-off between the necessity of economic development through mining 
and the protection of indigenous rights and the environment. A holistic and sustainable 
balance between the two ambitions is not reflected in the cases, but the national project of 
lithium extraction reflects a significantly better developmental prospect, than that of a foreign 
enclave mining activity.   
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1. Introductory sections 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Evo Morales was elected as the first indigenous president of Bolivia in 2005. He was envisioning 
a cultural, socialist and democratic revolution for Bolivia, and had an ambitious aspiration to 
redress centuries of discrimination and oppression against the indigenous populations. In his 
election campaign, one focus area was that the Bolivian state should be participatory and 
inclusive allowing for popular social movements to influence government programmes. 
Secondly, that neoliberalism should be eradicated as it was the root cause of suffering of the 
Bolivian population. Lastly, that national sovereignty should be secured by freeing Bolivia from 
U.S. imperialism and neoliberal capitalism (Postero, 2010: 24). The new government led by 
Morales’ party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)1 can thus be associated with a growing wave 
of nations from the global south and, specifically, Latin American new leftist, socialist 
governments, who begin to challenge the Western dominance of the capitalist world system and 
reject Western imperialism and symbolic colonisation (Artaraz & Calestani, 2014: 2, 4; 
Bebbington, A. 2012: 5). Morales committed himself to ensure indigenous rights, socio-
economic justice and popular democracy reflected in the MAS government’s National 
Development Plan from 2006. In line with this, Morales would regain control over the Bolivian 
economy by nationalising the country's rich natural resources and extractive sectors, where the 
profit was envisioned to drive the socio-economic change.  
 
The Morales government has engaged in and committed itself to a wide-ranging process of social 
transformation by introducing and incorporating the indigenous philosophy and concept called 
Vivir bien (living well) into state policies. This has contributed to an expanded bill of rights for 
previously excluded indigenous communities in the new constitution of 2009 and a progressive 
environmental law ensuring Pachamama (Mother Earth) individual rights. The government of 
Bolivia has therefore both committed itself to ensuring sustainability of environment and 
                                                 
1
 Full name: Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Movement for 
Socialism- Political instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples ). 
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upholding indigenous rights while creating economic growth through extractive industries such 
as mining.  
 
President Morales and his government represent an intricate blend of different ideologies, logics, 
and agendas. One category of discourses centres around nationalisation, growth and development 
through extraction of the country’s resource abundance. This discourse has among others been 
termed “andean capitalism” (Kaup, 2010), “neo-developmentalism” (Cunha et al., 2010) and 
“post-neoliberalism” (Artaraz & Calestani, 2014). The second discourse articulates 
environmental protection, indigenous identity politics and human rights. This has been defined as 
“twenty-first-century socialism” (Cunha et al., 2010), “indigenous nationalism”, “national 
socialism” and “indigenous popular hegemony” (Postero, 2010). This discursive binary will 
constitute the essence of this project: how does Evo Morales and the MAS administration 
balance political rhetoric, policy formulation and practice between these two possibly conflicting 
paradigms and ideologies?  
 
For Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America, the richness of natural resources and 
especially the finding of the world’s largest lithium reserve opens a series of opportunities for the 
future. Historically, the popular wide perception among Bolivians of neoliberal economics have 
been a plunder of the natural resources from minerals to forests, gas and water by a small global 
capitalist elite (Artaraz & Calestani, 2014: 4). At a political level, the discourse surrounding 
nationalisation of extraction and industrialisation of natural resources within the country is 
presented as an exit from poverty and dependence from international aid (Ströbele-Gregor, 
2012). However, a challenge in securing the rights of nature and indigenous peoples is Bolivia’s 
structural dependence on extractive industry—with minerals and natural gas constituting 70% of 
its exports (Nacla, 2012)—and the government’s continued reliance on these sectors and non-
renewable resources for economic growth.  
 
This project will investigate the practical implications of the Bolivian national development 
model and political ambitions, encompassing both indigenous and nature rights and also of 
ensuring growth via extractive industries. Furthermore, it will investigate how the Bolivian 
government is trying to balance these two different and potentially conflicting and contradictory 
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logics. How are these discourses being transformed and negotiated when moving from the 
discursive level to the practical level? 
 
We will be investigating this question by exploring what happens when state policies reach the 
ground in two cases of extraction of natural resources via mining in Bolivia: the big silver and 
zinc mine, San Cristóbal, and the newly established lithium mine in Salar de Uyuni. How are the 
promises of indigenous rights framed as citizen rights, Pachamama and nature rights, inclusion, 
and redistribution of resources materialising in practice? Are the state revenue and rents 
generated from mining sufficient to drive the comprehensive socio-economic reform? 
 
The San Cristóbal mine is the largest mine in Bolivia. It has been fully operational since 2009 
and is the world's third-largest producer of silver and sixth-largest producer of zinc. It is owned 
by the Japanese transnational company Sumitomo via its Bolivian subsidiary Minera San 
Cristóbal (MSC).  
 
Lithium was discovered in 1985 in the salt desert of Bolivia, Salar de Uyuni, and is estimated to 
be the world’s largest lithium reserve. The national strategy for the lithium is both to extract and 
industrialise the valuable resource as reflected in the Supreme Act 29117 of the 1st of May 2007, 
where the state obtained the rights of administration, exploitation, processing, and 
commercialisation of these resources.  
 
The complex paradoxes in Bolivia’s current opportunities and challenges can be summarised in 
this case:  
 
”this remote salt flat high in the Andes is at the heart of a global battle which captures nearly 
every modern ideological struggle: north vs. south, east vs. west, socialism vs. capitalism, native 
vs. foreigner, rich vs. poor. What lies beneath the surface here could turn Bolivia (one of South 
America’s poorest countries) into the Saudi Arabia of the 21st century” (Neumann, 2010 in 
Valle and Holmes, 2013: 94).   
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1.2. Problem formulation and research questions 
 
Problem formulation 
How is the possible tradeoff between achieving economic growth through mining, and protection 
of indigenous and environmental rights addressed in the Bolivian development model and how is 
this reflected in the two cases of silver mining in San Cristóbal and lithium mining in Salar de 
Uyuni? 
 
Research questions  
● What characterises the development model of Bolivia in regard to mining and protection 
of indigenous and environmental rights? 
● How are the political ambitions of the Bolivian development model implemented in the 
two cases of silver mining in San Cristóbal and lithium mining in Salar de Uyuni? 
 
Definition of terms 
By development model it is understood that the Bolivian government is attempting to spur 
development in the country. It is an idea and strategy which the government attempts to bring 
together through their rhetoric and legislation to create social and economic development.  
 
We have chosen to use a terminology for the cases, that is the most commonly used in the 
literature and indicative for the respective case. This is why the terminology is not consistent, as 
one is termed in accordance with the mineral, “the lithium case”, and the other is named after the 
location of the mining site, “the San Cristóbal case”.   
 
1.3. Outline 
 
In this chapter we have introduced our problem formulation, setting up the scene of our project. 
The following is a brief outline of the content and main findings of each chapter. The arguments 
and conclusion that we will bring forward in this section has come up in our analysis and the 
analytical work has been done beforehand. Therefore this section has a communicative purpose.   
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In Chapter 2, we present our methodological approach, which establishes the basis for how we 
will analyse our findings as well as our empirical data. The methods applied are discourse 
analysis and embedded multiple-case study, with the choice of two relevant cases, individually 
analysed and then compared holistically, inspired by Tarrow’s paired comparison approach. The 
project is based on a scientific theoretical approach of social constructivism. We make use of 
primary data, such as legislature and political speeches as well as secondary data, such as 
academic research and research reports produced by Bolivian civil society organisations 
(henceforth CSOs).  
 
In Chapter 3, we work with the theoretical framework of citizenship theory to map out instances 
of inclusion and exclusion, community power, communitarian discourse, and modern citizenship. 
We will also draw on theoretical frameworks that explain economic development theory that is 
applicable to resource-rich countries such as Dutch disease and resource curse, as well as 
applying linkage theory along with identifying spillovers. 
 
In Chapter 4, we conduct a discourse analysis by applying a pragmatic approach to unravel how 
the president, his government and administration is constructing the Bolivian development model 
and a new national citizenship, by putting emphasis on how it is both committed to economic 
development through the extractive industry and to the protection of indigenous and nature 
rights. In this chapter the model is analysed on two levels: as intended by the Morales 
government’s rhetoric, and as expressed in the recent policies and legislation (the new 
constitution, the National Development Plan and others).  
 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we analyse how the concepts of the development model are 
reflected in the two cases of silver mining in San Cristóbal and lithium mining in Salar de Uyuni. 
We will do this by processing three analytical parameters related to our problem formulation and 
the contradictory ideologies exposed in the analysis of the Bolivian development paradigm. 
Firstly the case’s Contribution to economic development, secondly the Environmental impact and 
lastly the Inclusion, consultation and indigenous rights. 
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In Chapter 7, we draw our concluding discussion, comparing the two cases and combining them 
with the general Bolivian development plan. In light of the analysis, we raise questions and 
discuss the possibility of implementing a development model that both successfully achieves 
economic growth for the whole population while protecting the rights of minorities and the 
environment.  
 
1.4. Limitations 
 
In this report we have chosen to focus specifically on the two cases of mining, respectively of 
silver in San Cristóbal and lithium in Salar de Uyuni. At the same time we limit ourselves from 
several aspects. When talking about resources in Bolivia it is highly relevant to mention 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas), which, together with minerals, constitutes a large part of the Bolivian 
economy. Since hydrocarbons and minerals have different properties, especially in regard to 
commercialisation, we chose to focus our research on the two cases of minerals. San Cristóbal is 
the largest mining operation in the country and a very important economic asset for the state as 
well as the region. The mining of lithium represents a core feature of the Bolivian government's 
strategy of nationalisation policies, reflected in the will to industrialise and to create value of the 
country's natural resources, as well as a very large potential economic income because of the 
expected increase in demand and price for this material. This is why minerals and the untapped 
potential of industrialisation pose great opportunities for Bolivia and therefore is placed in the 
centre of political priority, but, as specified in the introduction, also create challenges and 
political contradictions. To do an in-depth analysis of the two cases, we also limit ourselves from 
including other mining activities (of which there are plenty in the area), this also excludes other 
types of mining entities, such as cooperatives. This we will get back to in section 2.3 'Case 
design'.  
 
In this project we also include analysis of legislation and discourse of the Morales government. 
At the same time, we limit ourselves from including public discourse and political disagreement, 
inside and outside the government, on the area of minerals, as it is not in the focus of this study. 
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Furthermore, international political and economic relations, as well as regulations in regard to 
natural resources, are not included as we look at the national consequences and dynamics. 
 
In our collection of data we have chosen not to go to Bolivia and generate primary data due to a 
limited time frame and because of this we rely, to a large extent, on secondary data. This has 
certain implications for our results since the different sources of data tend to have contradicting 
views especially on the areas of environmental impact and public consult, which we are not 
sufficiently able to verify. We will also further elaborate on our data retrieval in section 2.2 
'Choice of data'. With ample time, a survey among the local communities focusing on the degree 
of public consult and compare our results with the existing material could have been beneficial to 
this study. However, this was not possible in the existing project.   
 
Another limitation is that we do not differentiate between various indigenous groupings, thus we 
can be accused of homogenising a heterogeneous formation. This is however the wording and 
characterisation used in the political and legislative discourse and also in most academic 
literature used.  
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Philosophy of Science 
 
The theories and methods we have chosen to use and apply derive from a social constructivist 
paradigm and therefore this project subscribes to this tradition, accordingly. This implies our 
acceptance of a set of scientific assumptions and philosophical premises. On the continuum of 
radical to moderate social constructivism we are placing ourselves in the moderate social 
constructivist approach.  
 
Social constructivism, in its moderate version, determines how scientific facts are socially 
constructed. That does not mean that a dimension of reality does not exist nor are perceived by 
people as real, but, instead, what we can scientifically analyse is the social resultant of the 
interactions between different perspectives and different wills (Kukla, 2000). We assume that all 
social phenomena are constructed, where their meaning and connotations are not fixed entities, 
but are negotiated and constructed through social relations, and are contingent. Power, 
knowledge and discourse are interrelated and interdependent as discourses produce the social 
field and give meaning to objects and subjects, which is then again, produced in accordance with 
power (Klausen 2005:169).  
 
By making use of the methodology made available by constructivism we are in our discourse and 
rhetoric analysis showing how the interrelations among different actors, interests and their 
discourses, are creating the developmental reality in Bolivia, which we are looking into in our 
research. 
 
Thus our research in this project requires a consciousness and caution of our own position in, and 
individual assumptions about, underlying and naturalised power relations and understanding, 
dependent on the knowledge regime, we find ourselves in.  
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2.2. Choice of data 
 
Our analysis of the political rhetoric of the Bolivian president and government is based on a 
selection of speeches, statements, interviews and letters of President Evo Morales, which is not 
exhaustive of what exists and is obtainable, but sufficient for the intended purpose of identifying 
the various discourses and ideologies articulated by the government to reveal the political 
dichotomies in accordance with our problem formulation. Additionally, we are making extensive 
use of legal material such as policies, laws, strategies and the Bolivian constitution to explore 
and expose the ideological tensions.  
 
In our analysis of the two mining cases, we have chosen to make extensive use of secondary data 
mainly based on reports, articles and statements from Bolivian and Latin American NGO’s, 
associations and research organisations involved in natural resources and indigenous interests of 
various kinds, as well as official statements from the San Cristóbal mine and from GNRE, the 
government’s agency for lithium-extraction. The assumption is that the observer’s position, and, 
thus, the position from which data are constructed, is central for the method of a research within 
social sciences and especially for the constructivist approach. Therefore, we have critically 
assessed the sources of our secondary data and where contradictions have been detected, all 
perspectives have been analysed and included. These contradictions seem both to be due to 
apparent conflicting interests and also differing interpretations. This is in accordance with the 
central focus of our research, that represents a social, economic, rhetorical and ideological 
tension, that more adequately can be analysed through secondary data and literature, than with 
the collection of primary data as we are incorporating various perspectives from different actors 
and academic disciplines. It would not have been possible to gather primary data on 
environmental impact within the timeframe of this research, and furthermore primary data 
collection and data analysis in this discipline is outside our field of research and expertise.  
 
Specific data sources will be introduced the first time they are mentioned. In line with critically 
assessing our sources, we find it important to comment on data from the Latin American NGO, 
CEDLA, which we make use of in our analysis of the Mining Law of 2014 as well as the case of 
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lithium. CEDLA has a clear agenda of protecting indigenous communities as well as the 
environment. Therefore it has been a priority to nuance the arguments of CEDLA, by supporting 
them with other sources or presenting contradicting arguments, where these have been present. 
Since a large part of our data is in Spanish, we rely on our own translation into English - the 
original quotes will appear in footnotes. 
 
2.2.1. Case Design 
 
This project’s type of problem formulation - when looking at the transformation from rhetoric to 
praxis - seemed to be most adequately explored through a case study. A case study can be 
actively chosen when a “how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, 
over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2009: 9). This definition clearly fits our 
research. 
 
Robert K. Yin (2009) has produced a useful categorisation for case studies, dividing them in 
“four basic types”, coming from the crossing of two variables: single or multiple-case; and 
holistic or embedded. In this categorisation, our research represents, with some specifics, an 
embedded multiple-case study: we are, in fact, utilising more than one case and we are 
developing two different units of analysis (while in the holistic design the unit is singular). 
Nevertheless, the two units of analysis will also partly find a holistic approach in the last chapter, 
Concluding Discussion. 
 
Paired comparison has been the method inspiring our approach to the analysis of the two cases; 
nevertheless, it has not been applied systematically. Paired comparison is a method largely used, 
especially in comparative political studies, but it’s not yet fully theorised; Sidney Tarrow’s 
(2010) work is one of the first attempts in the direction of a systematic theorisation. The primary 
advantage of paired comparison as opposed to a single case study is its ability to reinforce the 
causality comparing the effect of single variables on the outcome. Why only two cases then? 
According to Tarrow, the answer is that the ideal balance between inferential power and 
descriptive depth offered by two cases progressively diminishes its strength. This happens 
because the number of unmeasured variables becomes larger while enlarging the number of 
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cases, and, thus, the comparative power of paired comparison becomes weaker (Tarrow, 2010: 
246). 
 
Tarrow’s theorisation also mentions the main ‘pitfalls’ of paired comparison (Ibid.: 247): non-
representativeness and atheoretical case selection are those concerning this project. Surely paired 
comparison can lack representativeness because, with only two cases, it is not possible to add 
more factors, external to the two cases, to the comparison. Nevertheless, considering the 
scientific role of case studies, that offer depth instead of larger universal explanations, the choice 
of the “right” two cases, that are “comparable but exhibit different processes or outcomes” 
(Ibid.: 250), can compensate the non-representativeness and the atheoretical selection.  
 
2.2.2. Choice of cases 
 
The two cases of mining have been selected among a large number of different mining activities 
in Bolivia. The extraction of lithium in Salar de Uyuni was the first case to gain our attention. 
The salt desert holds the world's largest lithium reserve and the extraction and industrialisation of 
the mineral represents a huge potential income for the poorest country of South America. 
Furthermore, lithium extraction is at the heart of the present political discourse and the will of 
the Morales government. The industrialisation and Bolivian production of lithium batteries 
captures the essence of the government’s wish to free itself from Western dependence and take 
control of the nations’ resources.  
 
The San Cristóbal silver mine is the largest mine in Bolivia and an important economic 
contributor in the region as it pays royalties to the local government and employs a large number 
of local workers. In many ways it represents the opposite of the lithium mine, where the lithium 
extraction is fully state-controlled and the silver mine is owned by the Japanese company, 
Sumitomo. Revenues from lithium are distributed among the state, the regional governments and 
the national mining company, while Sumitomo is allowed to take profit from the silver mine 
outside the country. As opposed to lithium, there is no processing of silver and other minerals 
from San Cristóbal as it is exported directly as a primary commodity. In this way, it is 
contradictory to the present political discourse as it is contributing relatively little to the local 
community, compared to what is exported.   
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There are, however, similarities as well. Both cases revolve around extraction of non-renewable 
resources, with the potential of environmental impact, and they are operating in areas primarily 
inhabited by indigenous populations.  
The primary similarities and differences of the two cases are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of cases. 
San Cristóbal mine Lithium mine , Salar de Uyuni 
Material: Silver, zinc and lead Material: Lithium and potassium 
Private, foreign State owned 
No state investment Large state investment 
No industrialisation Large potential for industrialisation 
Export of profit Revenue goes to the state and region 
Potential for artisanal mining No potential for artisanal mining 
Fully operational since 2009 Not yet fully operational 
Similarities 
  
Economic contribution to the region Economic contribution to the region 
Employment of local labour Employment of local labour 
Large investments in infrastructure Large investments in infrastructure 
Potentially large environmental impacts Potentially large environmental impacts 
Located near indigenous communities Located near indigenous communities 
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2.4. Discourse Analysis 
 
We are conducting a discourse analysis of the political paradigm and rhetoric of president 
Morales and the MAS government. In this analysis we do not apply a stringent discourse 
analytical framework in line with, for example, Faircloughs strict linguistic critical analysis or 
Foucaults looser, discursive power analysis. 
We are inspired by the methodological tools and frameworks that social-constructivist 
perspectives offer, and we take a very pragmatic approach to the discourse analysis of the 
Bolivian political paradigm. Practically, we are looking for certain key concepts and words 
related to how development is conceptualised by the Morales government to unravel the different 
discourses articulated, the assumptions they are based on, and what ideologies and agendas they 
draw on.  
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3. Theory  
 
We are in this project working with a political and developmental paradox, which we will 
scrutinise with two different theoretical frameworks. The first part of the theoretical framework 
goes under the label of “citizenship theory”. In this project, we are facing a context, where 
Bolivia is undergoing structural and social change under the Morales government; in this change, 
citizenship and community action will potentially play a historically bigger role, than previously. 
It is in our interest to map out theoretical aspects, such as theories of inclusion and exclusion of 
groups, community power and modern citizenship, inspired by Barbara Cruikshank, Gerard 
Delanty and Giorgio Agamben. The second part of our theoretical framework will relate to 
economic development in resource-rich developing countries. A large part of the Bolivian 
economy is made up of natural resources and therefore theory on resource dependency, as well 
as linkages and spillovers from extractive industries, will be presented. The structural changes of 
the Morales government also highly affects the commodity sector, in the sense that Bolivia has 
tried to counter some of the challenges that are common in economies based on natural 
resources, by nationalising a large part of the commodity sector. Theory by Oliver Morrisey, 
Morris et al. (2011) and Buur et al. (2013) will be included to investigate this.  
 
3.1. Citizenship theory  
 
In the field of universal citizenship, the concepts of people and citizenship are strongly 
connected with each other in modern democracy, especially on the political stage of a developing 
country, like Bolivia, where ideas and projects of poverty fighting and participation are 
addressed. 
 
In order to build a theoretical field, political scientist Barbara Cruikshank’s theory can be used as 
a starting point. Her main argument can be summarised, in her own words, as: “democratic 
citizenship is less a solution to political problems than a strategy of government” (Cruikshank, 
1999: 1). In a foucauldian approach she takes as her point of departure the idea that even 
democracy, as any other kind of government, is still a way of exercising power, and it is prone to 
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dangers and constraints as any other kind of government, far from an idealistic view of 
democracy. 
 
Participation and citizenship are therefore not something prior to politics, they are instead 
expressions of this specific political power called democracy. Citizenship, specifically, is “an 
effect and an instrument of political power rather than simply a participant in politics” 
(Cruikshank, 1999: 5). 
 
In this perspective, the social dimension is part of the political sphere that is constantly reshaped 
and redefined, in a dynamic perspective and with relations of power, where citizenship is one of 
the main elements of transformation. Modern democratic power, especially, takes largely place 
in the social dimension, in the so-called “civil society”, with volunteer organisations, social 
movements, communities of different nature and size: all parts of what we consider as 
citizenship.  
 
This power is, thus, occupied with the constant definition of who is included and who is 
excluded within a specific community, and particularly within the larger national community. 
Community is, thus, a central concept that needs at this point to be better explored. 
 
3.1.1 Communities and exclusion 
 
Many political leaders in opposition to the global system are nowadays arguing that modernity 
has destroyed the real sense of community, and thus of society, a sense that they want to recover, 
in an “indigenous search for roots” (Delanty, 2003: 14).  
 
Many movements of the last century, and we will see that the same is happening in present-day 
Bolivia, have been strongly based on the idea of community as a rejection of modernity, with a 
normative characterization of the community as the place of tradition and morality (Ibid.:25). 
This thought, which can be theoretically reconducted to Durkheim, sees community as the place 
of tradition and resistance against modernity. But by putting too much emphasis on the link 
between community and tradition, we would lose sight of the radical, and even violent, forms in 
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which communities have been shaped in the past (Delanty, 2003: 47-48). Furthermore, inclusion 
and exclusion within the concept of community would also be lost.   
 
The theoretical concept of community will be used in this project to allow an analysis of how 
certain citizens are included and excluded in governmental activities. This concept of community 
will also allow for a differentiation of the groups of citizens, or in other words a “group-based” 
citizenship (Kyed & Buur, 2006) and how their citizenship is enacted, for example, whether 
through rights or through participation. A traditional perception of community, revolving around 
morality and opposition could, however, help frame the rhetoric and politics of Morales.  
Passing to a more strictly political approach, the recall of the idea of community is today 
particularly strong. Most of the theorization on political philosophy and community lies in the 
civic foundation of modern societies, and, thus, on citizenship (Delanty, 2003: 72). In this 
context it is in our interest to go deeper into communitarianism, a broad approach on citizenship 
and community with some peculiar characteristics. 
 
Community, within the communitarian position, is the place of a wider idea of citizenship: 
citizenship is the social mode of the individual, not fully individual but rather member of a 
community, intended as a larger community of people, such as a national community (Delanty, 
2003: 73-74). Communitarianism concerns a post-traditional idea of community, with a major 
focus on its conflict with modern society, while the conflict is left out from the community itself 
(Ibid.: 91). Delanty distinguishes four main versions of communitarianism: liberal, radical, civic, 
and governmentalised (Ibid.: 74). 
 
Particularly, the civic and governmentalised version will prove relevant to our analysis. In the 
latter version, the discourse of communitarianism has been governmentalised on the Bolivian 
political stage during the Morales and MAS period. Communities have become, in Bolivia as in 
many countries of the global south, one of the main bases of the anti-systemic discourses. 
Community is a term that can be used from all political positions. It represents, with the idea of 
citizenship linked to it, one of the tools of the “technology of power” of modern democracies. 
Surely, these discourses are also means of community empowerment other than only tools of 
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power; nevertheless, communitarian discourses are often used merely as politics of legitimacy 
(Delanty, 2003: 89-90). 
 
Civic communitarianism focuses on participation and an active civil society. The idea here is that 
community is the center of public life, in which the individual finds its highest expression in this 
dimension. Citizenship is, thus, active, or “radical”, as participation in the civic life.  
 
This focus on communitarian citizenship, does not necessarily include a policy that rise from 
below but more, in the sense of the technologies of citizenship defined by Cruikshank (1999), a 
precise policy from above. This is a policy that does not fully, as it claims to do, answer to the 
problems of exclusion linked with the colonial period (and the term of “decolonisation” will be a 
recurrence in our discourse analysis), simply because it is not necessarily designed for this 
purpose and, maybe most importantly, it is not necessarily designed from below (Kyed & Buur, 
2006).  
 
In this direction, the idea of categorisation of the poor, linked with the ambiguity of the concept 
of a people, will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.1.2 Categorisation of the poor and the concept of People 
 
The idea of categorisation of the poor, or “producing the poor” (Cruikshank, 1999) will be useful 
within the analysis of discourses of inclusion and exclusion on the Bolivian political stage. 
The categorisation of the poor has strong roots in human society. This idea is related to the 
ambiguity that lies in the concept of people, as theorised by Giorgio Agamben (2000). The term 
people has, Agamben suggests, a duality of meaning: it includes both all the People, the whole 
cohesive (national) community, and the different peoples of the lowest classes; the poor, the 
marginalized, the excluded.  
 
The concept of people is, in other words, constantly oscillating: 
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 “between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the People as a whole and as an integral body 
politic and, on the other hand, the people as a subset and as fragmentary multiplicity of needed 
and excluded bodies” (Agamben, 2000: 31).   
 
This duality is linked to a deeper fracture, a “biopolitical fracture” between inclusion and 
exclusion: the concept of people is part of a whole in which it cannot be included, or a whole in 
which it is included but it does not belong to. The realisation of this concept coincides with the 
abolition of itself, the realization of the People in the abolition of the people; in a paradox in 
which the definition of the unity of the People needs the elimination of the multiplicity of the 
people, which the People is constituted by (Agamben, 2000: 32). 
 
 
3.1.3. Citizenship and development 
 
Hence, the utilization of the word people on the political stage, especially while used in context 
of poverty reduction, goes in the ideal direction of trying to constantly re-establish the unity of 
the People removing the category of the people of the excluded. The pursuit of development is 
the idea, the frame, that, as a mantra, is (futilely) evoked to accomplish this unity: “the obsession 
with development is so effective in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical plan to 
produce a people without fracture” (Agamben, 2000: 33). 
 
In development strategies, the poor is often the main target, and, thus, is also always defined. 
Cruikshank refers to “self-help”, intended as improvement of individuals’ living conditions 
without the formal intervention of a higher authority, as the political instrument of producing the 
poor. This is a political instrument that links the individual citizenship to the social dimension as 
a whole, and that, in this way, can represent a durable solution, since every “forced” action 
would have an effect as long as the forced action itself is in place.  
 
Self-help turns the argument of poverty making people engage in a useful citizenship that can 
actively improve the poors’ condition, thus this strategy needs a “maximised citizenship”. And in 
this point lies part of the concept of citizenship as an instrument of power, a strategy of 
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government: “Self-help is a political relationship, a technique for solving political problems such 
as poverty” (Cruikshank, 1999: 55).  
 
Whether from the political right or left, the efforts of “empowering the poor”, beyond their 
different intentions, share the same techniques: “to act upon others by getting them to act in their 
own interest” (Cruikshank, 1999: 68). Empowerment is not simply improving the capacity of the 
subject to act in his interest, “rather than merely increasing that capacity, empowerment alters 
and shapes it” (Ibid.: 71). 
 
To shape these strategies of empowerment, the group of the poor has to be defined and 
categorised. It represents a useful and effective category for political action since it gives a 
cohesive category to address. The idea that the poors share a common identity was more and 
more reinforced in this direction, as we will notice also in our analysis regarding the indigenous 
peoples.  
 
“Community action” has a crucial role in this process of categorisation. By considering 
empowerment as the result of community actions, it is committed to individual, citizens’ actions, 
instead of an actual institutional action (Cruikshank, 1999: 76-81), and, thus, becomes a tool of 
power.  
 
3.2. Resource curse, linkages and spillovers 
 
3.2.1. Resource curse and Dutch disease 
 
The conventional wisdom in development theory regarding natural resources is that exploitation 
of natural resources undermines industrial growth in resource-rich developing countries. This is 
commonly described as the ‘resource curse’, which entails that there is a trade-off between the 
commodity and the industrial sector. Growth in the industrial sector is often combined with a 
higher income per capita and therefore economic development. For this reason “[...] 
strengthening of the industrial sector lies at the heart of the development agenda” (Morris et al., 
2011: 6).  
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The background for this is that there seems to be a negative correlation between resource 
abundance, defined by percentage of primary commodities in GDP as well as the share of 
primary commodities in exports, and economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997 in Morris et al., 
2011: 9). Sachs and Warner argued that the major driver of this was the Dutch disease, which 
includes that investments in commodity production diverts capital and skilled labour from other 
sectors to the extractive sector (Sachs and Warner, 1997/2001 in Morris et al., 2011: 9). 
Furthermore, according to Singer, the extraction of hard commodities can be seen as an enclave 
activity that is very capital-intensive, has few linkages to the local economy and therefore does 
not create jobs or transfer knowledge to other sectors (Singer, 1950 in Morris et al., 2011: 10).  
 
Also, economies relying to a large degree on rents from the commodity sector are very 
vulnerable to external price shocks, defined by international commodity prices. These factors are 
highly relevant when looking at Bolivia, since a large part of the country’s GDP and exports are 
made up of primary commodities like oil, gas, and minerals. In many ways, the creation of 
linkages is seen as the way of strengthening the synergy between the commodity and the 
industrial sector, thus, reaping benefits from commodities, creating sustainable economic 
development. 
 
3.2.2. Linkages and spillovers 
 
“Ultimately, linkages in extractives may assist industrial development and economic 
transformation by developing skills and capabilities in local manufacturing and service sectors” 
(UNECA, 2013, in Buur et al., 2013: 28). 
 
Buur et al. (2013) defines linkages as “inter-firm transactions that go beyond arm’s length, 
one-off transactions and involve longer term collaborations between the parties” (Hansen 
et al., 2009: 122 in Buur et al., 2013: 33). This definition of linkages is focused on the interaction 
between companies. In the present research, we will define these as ‘production linkages’, as we 
make use of the three specific types of linkages identified by economist Albert Hirschman; 
fiscal, consumption, and production linkages. Fiscal linkages are the rents a government attracts 
from the commodity sector, such as corporate tax and royalties. Consumption linkages are the 
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commodity sector’s rising demands for the output from other sectors, in our case this could be 
demand for schools, banks, restaurants, and other such services for the region of extraction. 
Production linkages are industrial linkages to the commodity’s value-chain that involve 
backward linkages; local companies producing inputs to be used in extraction, and forward 
linkages; local companies processing outputs from the extraction (Morris et al., 2011:25). Both 
Buur et al. and Morris et al. distinguish between “[...] the breadth of linkages (the range of inputs 
purchased or outputs processed domestically) and the depth of linkages (the extent of local value 
added in these linkages)” (Ibid.: 7). In this study, we will also make use of direct and indirect 
effects, that respectively relates to effects as a direct result of the extractive intervention and 
effects that are related, as for example construction of infrastructure, creation of jobs in 
supplementing sectors etc. (Buur et al., 2013: 33). In this sense, consumption linkages will to a 
large extent be described as indirect linkages.  
 
Related to linkages are the effects of spillovers which are non-monetary and usually include the 
transfer of knowledge and skills to a specific sector. The theory behind spillovers is that through 
knowledge and skill spillovers, industries in a sector will grow and innovate. Thus, the greater 
opportunities for spillovers, the greater the chances for development (Morrisey, 2012). Morrisey, 
however, notes that forward and backward production linkages, and following spillovers to the 
local economy, can only happen if the extracting company demands products that can be 
produced locally, or produces commodities that can be processed locally. In this research, we 
will define spillovers as the learning and knowledge that passes through linkages, thus, 
enhancing the technical capacity in the local economy. Linkages and spillovers, therefore, play a 
huge role in providing foundation for further industrialisation. As Hirschman argues:  
 
“[...] the direct forward and backward linkages were the most likely to lead to the 
development of a more diversified economic structure. In other words, by relating directly to the 
output structure of the commodities sector, “one thing” would indeed “lead to another”” 
(Hirschman in Morris et al. 2011: 25).  
 
An important argument in this quote is that Hirschman found fiscal linkages to be less efficient 
in promoting industrialisation (and, thus, economic diversification) than forward and backward 
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production linkages. Fiscal linkages in themselves were not enough to catalyze growth, but 
needed to be prudently and productively reinvested in other sectors of society (Morris et. al 
2011: 25). It must be noted, that spillovers from the extractive sector only creates growth in other 
sectors if trained labour moves or if there is a certain cooperation between sectors, facilitating the 
passing of knowledge. If the activity is to a high degree an enclave activity, as described above, 
the effect on other sectors and economic development in general can be very limited.  
 
“...there is always an inherent danger of extractive FDI evolving into enclaves 
in host countries, creating jobless growth, causing little or no upgrading of local 
industrial capacity and even amplifying already existing inequalities.” (Buur, Therkildsen, 
Hansen & Kjær, 2013: 27). 
 
Creating linkages to and from the commodity sector also serves another purpose than just growth 
and industrialisation, namely a safeguard against the aforementioned price volatility, thus, 
making it “less vulnerable to the shocks which confront monoculture economies” (Morris et al. 
2011: 6). Morris et al. (2011), therefore, questions the view of industrialisation not being 
compatible with, and is undermined by, resource extraction. They seek to debunk the assertion 
that commodity dependence prevents growth and actually argue against the “pessimistic resource 
curse‟ argument” and finds that the commodity sector have “unexploited opportunities” (Ibid.: 3) 
for creating industrial development by promoting linkages in said sectors. 
 
What contemporary theory points to is, therefore, not an either/or solution to the commodity vs. 
industrialisation discussion. Rather, as Farooki and Kaplinsky (2012) argue, it is a “synergistic 
link between the commodities and industrial sectors”, which can provide a constructive 
“feedback link whereby the growth of the industrial sector led to the development of knowledge 
and technologies that increased efficiency in the exploitation of commodities” (Farooki & 
Kaplinsky, 2012: 64). The developing of linkages can be pushed by legislative measures from 
the government (Buur et al., 2013: 6). Thus, the government can play an active role in creating 
synergy between the sectors and using resource rents to foster industrial development. In this 
research, we consider the Bolivian project of industrialisation of lithium in Salar de Uyuni as a 
such measure.  
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The theoretical overview presented in this chapter serves as the project’s theoretical base, which 
will be utilised throughout the project. Now we will continue to investigate the political 
paradigm and how the concept of development is constructed by the Bolivian government.   
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4. Bolivian development model 
 
 
This chapter serves to explore how the Bolivian development model and Morales “revolution” is 
conceptualised in the discourse and legislation of the president and his MAS government. We 
will start out with a discourse analysis of the political paradigm of development to unravel the 
political rhetoric and discourses of president Morales. Thereafter, we will look at how these 
discourses, ambitions and intentions are reflected in the national policies. Firstly, by looking at 
the incorporation of an expanded and ambitious bill of rights encompassing environmental, 
indigenous and participatory citizen rights. Afterwards economic strategies to generate national 
growth through mining will be assessed.  
 
4.1. Political paradigm of development 
 
In Morales’ inauguration speech, he described his visions for a new Bolivia as “a cultural 
democratic revolution” using a revolutionary and idealistic vocabulary with emphasis on national 
and territorial sovereignty and independence by referring to the Bolivian liberator Simon 
Bolivar’s struggle to found a patria grande, a grand motherland; the Bolivian nation needed to 
be refound and the Bolivian society decolonised. In addition, he rearticulated Che Guevara’s 
mission to build a new world in equality (Morales, 2006, Inauguration Speech). He stated that 
with his inauguration began an era that would put an end to the injustices indigenous peoples and 
workers had suffered through the past, which he compared with South Africa’s apartheid (Ibid.).  
  
4.1.1. Indigenist, socialist and populist discourse of Morales 
 
In this discourse analysis of the political rhetorical paradigm of the Morales government  we 
have been inspired by a framework proposed by Bolivian political scientist Roberto Laserna, 
with his identification of three identities or tendencies that characterise the political rhetorical 
paradigm of Morales administration and government, namely: indigenist, socialist and populist 
(Laserna, 2010 in Postero, 2010: 25).  
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The first tendency, indigenist, is pushing for de-colonisation of the Bolivian society by 
promoting indigenous rights and recognition (Postero, 2010: 25). In line with Cruikshank, this 
has a productive power as it is creating a national citizenship internally, which we will return to, 
and a positioning externally and internationally to demand cultural, political and economic 
sovereignty. The Morales “revolution” represents a return to indigenous culture for an alternative 
paradigm characterised by the incorporation and translation of the indigenous philosophy, Vivir 
bien, into public policy and political rhetoric:  
 
“We must decolonise ourselves of commoditisation and consumerism, luxury, egoism and greed, 
and promote Vivir bien [...] respecting the cycles of nature and understanding that all existing 
things are part of the balance and harmony of life2” (Morales, 2012).  
 
Vivir bien refers to the indigenous ideology and philosophical concept of “living well” that 
focuses on a harmonious relationship with nature that is in effect more biocentric than 
anthropocentric. It is better defined by the well-being in collective than individual terms, 
together with nature and the relationship between the planet and the people (Artaraz & Calestani, 
2014: 2,3). Morales asserts that he is refounding the true identity of Bolivia in his revolution 
through this ideology: “rebuilding the path of balance, complementarity, and consensus with its 
own identity, Vivir bien3” (Morales, 2014), thus, empowering “the knowledges and codes of the 
ancient cultures of the world4” (Morales, 2012). Here, he is making use of language of identity 
politics, and recalling a Delantian governmentalised and civic discourse of communitarianism, 
by recognising cultural and minority rights in privileging indigenous morality, knowledge and 
belief systems in his discourse, by promoting “Communitarian Socialism of Living Well”: 
“based on rights and not on the market, [...] through the full complementarity of the rights of 
peoples, persons, states and Mother Earth in a complementary, inclusive and interdependent 
                                                 
2
 Original quote: “Es necesario descolonizarnos del mercantilismo y consumismo, del lujo, del egoísmo y de la 
codicia para promover el Vivir bien [...]  respetando los ciclos de la naturaleza y comprendiendo de que todo lo que 
existe es parte del equilibrio y de la armonía de la vida”. 
3
 Original quote: “reconstruir el camino del equilibrio, de la complementariedad, del consenso con identidad propia, 
del Vivir bien”. 
4
  Original quote: “los conocimientos y códigos de las culturas milenarias en el mundo”.  
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way5” (Morales, 2012). The second tendency, socialist, mainly controls the government’s 
economic policy and administration. It articulates the state as collective and commonwealth and 
as having a main position in the economy by reclaiming and nationalising natural resources, that 
were privatised in recent decades (Postero, 2010: 24). Here words such as sovereignty, 
independence, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are recurrent. In Morales’ rhetoric, 
nationalisation is always accompanied with a very vocal rejection of capitalism and 
“transnational powers that enrich themselves at the expense of the peoples6”, thus excluding a 
part of the population which is part of that transnational capitalism. Here, nationalisation of 
natural resources is represented as the only solution: 
 
“only through such nationalization we can stop the processes of economic colonialism and 
ensure the reinforcement of the state with economic resources that in turn promote better basic 
services for their peoples7” (Morales, 2012). 
 
The nationalisation is, in this discourse, coupled with redistribution of wealth, service provision, 
welfare for the people: “toward the enjoyment and benefit of all8” (Morales, 2012), which is 
highly related to the third tendency.   
 
In the final tendency, populist, Morales politically addresses the civil society, clearly resembling 
Cruikshank’s notion of maximising citizenship. In his rhetoric, he is heavily drawing on a 
discourse of communitarian democracy with dominant and recurrent words such as civil society, 
communion and peoples coupled with peaceful negotiation, ballots, equal, constitutional rights 
and democratic transformation (Morales in Al Jazeera, 2008; Morales, 2010). Here, the Bolivian 
indigenous and people in general are addressed in a vocabulary of democracy and citizenship and 
so are converted into citizens, addressed in and integrated into the language of citizenship, rights 
and democracy. Morales is actively using what resembles Delantian civic communitarianism to 
                                                 
5
 Original quote: “basada en los derechos y no en el mercado[...]  a través del cumplimiento integral de los derechos 
de los pueblos, las personas, los Estados y la Madre Tierra, de manera complementaria, incluyente e 
interdependiente”. 
6
  Original quote: “potencias transnacionales que se enriquecen a costa de los pueblos” 
7
  Original quote: “solamente a través de esta nacionalización se puede quebrar los procesos de colonialismo 
económico y garantizar el fortalecimiento del Estado con recursos económicos que, a su vez, impulsen mayores 
servicios básicos para los pueblos”. 
8
  Original quote: “orientados al goce y beneficio de todos”. 
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constitute his participatory nation state by promoting civic active participation and engagement 
in democratic practices. This also resembles Cruikshank’s notions of democratic citizenship. 
Morales promotes social movements as political institutions thus politicising indigenous people 
and social movements as a move away from their exclusion from and the political elite’s 
traditional hold on decision-making:  
 
“The people, through their social and community organizations, must take political power, 
building new forms of plurinational states, so that we shall govern ourselves within the 
framework of leading by obeying9” (Morales, 2012). 
 
In this quote Morales touches upon the practical side of the discourse, where social movements 
are highlighted as an important institution with the practices of popular pressure, activism and 
union logic of confrontation with roots in social movements, which is also emphasized by 
Postero (Postero, 2010: 29).  
 
4.1.2. Morales’ construction of an indigenous citizenship 
 
In his election campaign, Morales claimed to be representing the poor and indigenous, who he 
referred to as the Bolivian people. Prior to his election, Morales articulated concerns over both 
class and race (Postero, 2010: 24). In his inauguration speech Morales directly linked his 
presidency, his party, MAS, and government to the indigenous identity politics, cultural and 
political rights and with that made a strong reference to human rights with specific emphasis on 
cultural and workers’ rights (Morales, 2006, Inauguration speech). Morales aims at and claims 
that he is producing a Bolivian citizenship that captures both of Agamben’s People and people 
by including the previously excluded bodies, people, into his construction of the People. At the 
same time, he is coupling the category “class” reflected in “poor” and the category of “race” 
reflected in “indigenous”, thus producing a new citizenship based on including the excluded and 
moreover a new discursive interconnection by combining race and class. Morales himself is an 
aymara indian and is making active use of this ethnic category to construct a legitimacy to 
                                                 
9
 Original quote: “El pueblo, por intermedio de sus organizaciones sociales y comunitarias, debe tomar el poder 
político construyendo nuevas formas estatales plurinacionales para que nos gobernemos a nosotros mismos en el 
marco del mandar obedeciendo.” 
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represent the indigenous majority. In his rhetorical performance, he is commonly expressing 
himself through “we”, which embraces the indigenous. He, thereby, makes a strong interlink 
between him and the People he is constructing as the indigenous populations that, all together, 
represent more than 60% of the Bolivian population and he identifies himself with the subaltern 
and marginalised - both as a representative of the excluded in the international society and in 
Bolivia (Morales, 2010; 2012; 2014). Quite simply, the indigenous groups, formerly a people, is 
now constituting the quintessence of the People constructed by Morales. He is, however, also 
representing Bolivia as a nation state with only one People, a “communal democracy in which 
there are neither majorities nor minorities, but instead decisions are taken by consensus10” 
(Morales, 2012). 
 
The previously excluded indigenous peoples, and their empowerment, are constructed as the 
backbone of his citizenship: “We have been marginalised, humiliated […] and never recognised 
as human beings [...] the original indigenous movement, as well as our ancestors, dreamt about 
recovering the territory” (Morales, 2010). He, additionally, seeks to include the at that time 
People with capital P: “I am  proud of the middle class, the working class, the professionals, and 
the businessmen. I invite them as well to be proud of the indigenous people who are the moral 
reserve of humanity11” (Morales, 2006); here, also explicitly leading back the traditional 
morality, the “moral reserve of humanity”, to the original community of the indigenous people, 
resembling Delanty’s words about community discourse as a rejection of modernity, which in 
Morales’ discourse is global capitalism. 
 
In this discourse, it is clear that what is implied by “people”, utilising Agamben’s (2000) notions, 
is not the whole national body politic, but the previously different “needed” and “excluded 
bodies”, addressed as a unity, and again with the exclusion of parts of the national population. 
He rarely acknowledges that, while constructing a united, all-inclusive Bolivian People, he 
simultaneously constructs an excluded part, the people. This people, however, is no longer the 
                                                 
10
 Originl quote: “democracia comunal donde no existen mayorías ni minorías, sino más bien las decisiones se 
toman en consenso” 
11
 Original quote: “hemos sido marginados, humillados...a estos pueblos jamás los reconocieron como seres 
humanos”; ”el  movimiento indígena originario, así como nuestros antepasados, soñaron recuperar el territorio”; “yo 
me siento orgulloso de ellos, de nuestra clase media, intelectual, profesional, hasta empresarial, pero también les 
invito a ustedes que se sientan orgullosos de los pueblos indígenas que son la reserva moral de la humanidad.”  
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indigenous population, but a new political minority: the previous political elite, the right wing 
who “sucked the blood of Bolivia12” (Morales in Al Jazeera, 2008). This potential exclusion is 
justified by the fact that: ”These conservative groups do not want democratic transformation or 
peaceful change and especially if it means promoting equality” (Ibid.). 
 
Moreover, while addressing the indigenous people, he never specifies what indigenous group he 
is referring to or represents, thus also homogenising the different fragments within indigenous 
people and eliminating the multiplicity. In his homogenous construction indigenous are 
constructed as one group. However, in reality, indigenous comprise numerous and complex 
groups, categories and identities, which has been negotiated and resisted throughout Bolivian 
history and political periods13. He is recognising the diversity of his People, hence, plurinational 
states, but not the potential conflicting interests and identities in the heterogeneity and potential 
different levels of inclusion because he is setting up some premises and conditions for inclusion 
in his category of citizen, namely, the belief in equal rights and inclusion of the excluded: 
 
“There are bolivians with blue and green eyes […] There are people with black skin. I always 
say we are all Bolivian. Those who have been here the longest, the indigenous people, are the 
majority and they are the poorest. And the other who are the minority are the richest. Our 
constitution seeks to equalise these two groups14” (Morales in Al Jazeera, 2008). 
 
4.1.3. Bolivias response to neoliberalism 
 
The Morales government’s national project and complex discursive mixture is reflected in a new 
National Development Plan from 2006 (El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, henceforth, PND). It 
heavily criticizes neoliberalism and capitalism for its exploitative nature and unequal distribution 
of wealth and power, thus, proposing in its stead a new development paradigm and ideology.  
                                                 
12
 Al Jazeera translation has been used, since the dubbing track does not allow to hear the original voice. 
13
 Additionally groups use use different indicators and terms for their identity, group or organisation: Native, 
indigenous, original people, indian (nativo, indígena, pueblo originario, indio) emphasizing identity and belonging 
or indigenous campesinos (campasino indígena) stressing both identity and class or lastly quechua or aymara where 
language becomes an identity marker (Postero 2007:11-13) 
14
 See note 10. 
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The PND’s overarching critique of neoliberalism is primarily based on the last 30 years of 
Bolivia’s history. But since the beginning of the 20th century Bolivia’s economy has fluctuated 
between nationalist economic policies and the neoliberal free-market model. Before 2006, 
neoliberalism had dominated the economy since 1985 (Cunha & Conçalves, 2010).  
 
The discourses articulated and the citizenship constructed by the Morales government claim to 
move Bolivia beyond capitalism and neoliberalism, but in very different ways. Many scholars 
argue that these different tendencies are not necessarily harmonious, and in practice they are 
highly entangled and negotiated, which outline the heterogeneous and ambiguous nature of the 
government (Postero, 2010: 27, Artaraz & Calestani, 2014: 2). In the next section, we will 
present part of the current government’s national project, namely, its commitment to inclusion, 
indigenous rights and natural conservation.   
 
4.2. Indigenous rights and Pachamama15 rights 
 
A number of recently developed policies and strategies reflect the radical shift towards 
participatory and inclusive forms of democracy articulated by the Morales government with 
emphasis on the role of a strong civil society in a new, decentralised state with comprehensive 
social policies, human rights and inclusion of the previously excluded groups of society. In the 
national development plan, this was manifested in the two chapters “Dignified Bolivia” and 
“Democratic Bolivia”16. Furthermore, in a constitutional reform and a radical new law on nature, 
these strategies were solidified, as the following section will show.  
 
                                                 
15
 Quechua and Aymara word for Mother Earth. Pachamama is the fertility goddess in the Inca mythology who 
presides over planting, harvesting and rule over the four organising features of nature: water, earth, sun and moon. 
“She” is believed to have subjectivity, agency and power over life on earth. We are using the indigenous word 
Pachamama for the concept of Mother Earth as it is in the Bolivian indigenous context a far-reaching idea, which 
connotes a set of ideologies, philosophical and practical ideas. This idea implies different ontological assumptions 
and goes way beyond the western understanding of “Mother Earth” and the knowledge regime that the authors of 
this project adhere to.  
16
 Original quote: “Bolivia Digna and Bolivia Democrática”.  
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4.2.1. Inclusion and participation  
 
The national development plan suggests that there has been a loss of “vision” of the country and 
of “appreciation of the value of the people and the nations, (and) their harmonic relation to the 
nature17” (PND, 2006: 1). Neoliberalism is accused of being the root cause of heightened 
inequality, a diminished public sector, exportation of natural resources without ensuring a 
domestic added value18, the exclusion of indigenous communities from the political, economic 
and cultural sphere, and of transferring surplus value outside of Bolivia (Ibid.: 3, 5).  
 
The plan, therefore, proposed several overarching objectives for the future of Bolivia with a 
strong reference to human rights such as dignified work, equal access to resources and minority 
rights:  
 
“to revert the inequality and the exclusion of the indigenous population [...] redistribution of 
national wealth, obtained to the benefit of social sectors traditionally excluded from the access 
to means of production and dignified, stable and adequately paid work, through the 
amplification and diversification of the productive sectors in a social matrix, the recovery of the 
domestic market and the redefining of our relationship to the international market, to always be 
to the benefit of the country19” (PND, 2006: 6). 
 
This is a strategy towards deepening democracy and promoting the active participation of civil 
society, civil organisations and the indigenous population and make them part of the national 
state, thus, sharing the responsibility with the government and state (PND, 2006: 82). The civil 
society is institutionalised by construction of their new role in: “design, monitoring and 
                                                 
17
 Original quote: “ la apreciación del valor de las personas y los pueblos, su interrelación armónica con la 
naturaleza”. 
18
 Which has been the main ideological and economical reason for nationalized industrialisation of Lithium 
extraction in Salar de Uyuni. 
19
 Original quote: “para revertir la desigualdad y la exclusión de la población indígena [...] redistribución de la 
riqueza nacional obtenida en beneficio de los sectores sociales tradicionalmente excluidos del acceso a los medios 
productivos y al empleo digno, adecuadamente remunerado y estable, mediante la ampliación y diversificación del 
aparato”. 
productivo en una matriz, la recuperación del mercado interno y la redefinición de nuestro relacionamiento con los 
mercados internacionales, siempre en beneficio del país.”  
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evaluation of regional and national development policies20” (PND, 2006: 20). It speaks of 
substituting the traditional, excluding power with a socially including power by constructing a 
new, all inclusive state, “sustained by the presence and effective power of the indigenous people 
and the social movements as well as civil and community organisations21” (Ibid.: 82) towards 
including and empowering previously marginalised groups such as children, women, indigenous, 
elders and rural inhabitants (Ibid.: 27). The people on communitarian land should manage their 
territory themselves as well as the indigenous territories, which should be managed publicly 
according to traditional (in the indigenous sense) usage and habits. It proposes political mandate 
and authority to regional indigenous people, social movements and civic organisations (Ibid.: 
87).  
 
In line with redistribution and inclusion, the strategy prioritizes provision of social services such 
as health, education, public security, basic sanitation, and access to water. It criticises earlier 
times’ centralised governance and advocates for a new, decentralised regional and municipal 
management.  
 
We are here within a theoretical landscape of technology of power that creates a “radical” 
citizenship, and considers communities as the centre of real democratic power. This happens  in 
the context of an official document, and thus configuring an institutionalised, or 
governmentalised discourse of communitarianism, where the language of communitarianism, 
and especially of “civic communitarianism”, with its focus on participation and civil society, has 
been embedded into the institutional PND. 
 
4.2.2. Constitutional obligation to indigenous rights 
 
In 2007, Bolivia signed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which entail 
the rights of indigenous people to sustain and strengthen their cultures and related institutions. 
The Bolivian government made these standards legally binding through national law (UN 2013: 
                                                 
20
 Original quote: “diseño, seguimiento y evaluación de políticas de desarrollo regionales y nacionales”. 
21
 Original quote: “sustentado en la presencia y el poder efectivo de los pueblos originarios y de los movimientos 
sociales, al igual que de las organizaciones ciudadanas y comunitarias”  
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78); in January 2009, the Bolivians voted in a referendum to change the constitution with 61.4% 
votes in favour.  
 
The constitutional reform led to a greater and far-reaching recognition of indigenous rights, 
cultural beliefs and judicial norms (Burnell et al., 2012: 171). The new constitution gives 
substantially more power to indigenous communities with an expanded bill of rights. 
Specifically, article 30 of the new constitution prescribes that communities should be consulted 
before legislative measures that may affect them are put into place. “The population has the right 
to participate in environmental management, and to be consulted and informed prior to 
decisions that could affect the quality of the environment22” (Constitution of Bolivia, article 343), 
and indigenous communities are in a separate article reiterated in these rights (Ibid., article 30). 
This consultation should be upheld “respected and guaranteed by the state, in good faith and in 
concerted way23” in regard to the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in the territory 
they inhabit (Ibid.).  
 
In an interview from 2009, Bolivia’s Vice President Alvaro García Linera was asked the 
following question: “If the communities say no, is the state still going to enter?”. He responded 
in a way that left little doubt as to the locus of power and the moral, utilitarian justification of its 
usage:  
 
“But combined with the right of a people to the land, is the right of the state, of the state led by 
the indigenous-popular and campesino movement, to superimpose the greater collective interest 
of all the peoples. And that is how we are going to go forward [sic]” (Bebbington, 2012: 135). 
 
Here, the vice president is rearticulating Morales’ discourse of broad representation and 
institutionalisation of social movements. However, it becomes evident that there exists “the 
needed and excluded bodies” of the people to constitute the People. The autonomous right of the 
state to undermine the peoples’ rights is being excused exactly by the state’s colonisation and 
                                                 
22
 Original quote: “La población tiene derecho a la participación en la gestión ambiental, a ser consultado e 
informado previamente sobre decisiones que pudieran afectar a la calidad del medio ambiente”.  
23
 Original quote: “se respetará y garantizará el derecho a la consulta previa obligatoria, realizada por el Estado, de 
buena fe y concertada”. 
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adoption of the language of social movements, which functions as a rhetorical shield, that 
connotes broad inclusion and "communitarian socialism”, at least at the rhetoric level.  
 
4.2.3. Pachamama entitled same rights as humans  
 
In continuation of the UN declaration and the 2009 constitution, the Morales government passed 
a radical and progressive environmental legislature in 2010. Bolivia had passed the first instance 
of environmental law that gives legal personhood to nature. Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra 
(Law of the Rights of Mother Earth) determines Pachamama24 as a legal subject with own rights, 
interests and as ”a collective subject of public interest”. It declares both Mother Earth and life-
systems (which combines human communities and ecosystems) as right holders of inherent 
rights specified in the law, including the right to life, biodiversity, pure water, clean air, and 
freedom from genetic modification and contamination (Law of the Rights of Mother Earth; 
Nacla, 2012). The new law is based on the aforementioned indigenous philosophy Vivir bien. 
 
The law is a result of the growing mobilisation of historically excluded indigenous populations 
and social movements on issues around identity politics encompassing legal and public 
acknowledgement of their identity and cultural beliefs and values, including their right to land 
and resources and recognition of their legal norms (Burnell et al., 2012: 171; Nacla, 2012).  
 
The law protects the right of nature to not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development 
projects that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities (Law of the 
Rights of Mother Earth). In practical terms, it means that all infrastructure, industry, and 
development projects must respect the natural environment and provide remediation for any 
incidental damages. Furthermore, the communities’ right to consultation is reiterated in this law 
thus granting them special group rights in line with so-called state-sponsored multiculturalism or 
multicultural constitutionalism.  
 
                                                 
24
 Quechua and Aymara word for Mother Earth. Pachamama is the fertility goddess in the Inca mythology who 
presides over planting, harvesting and rule over the four organising features of nature: water, earth, sun and moon. 
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The initial declaratory legislation was drafted by a coalition of CSOs, comprised of major 
Bolivian indigenous and rural organisations, small scale farmers and social movements called 
The Pact of Unity in 2010. The passed law is a compressed and shortened version of the initial 
draft (Nacla, 2012). Some of the initiators and authors of the original declaratory legislation from 
civil society have distanced themselves from it because, they argue, it is an ambiguous, 
unambitious and watered-down version of the plea for radical change. Accordingly, it is 
incompatible with the principles of Vivir bien, as it allows Bolivia to continue relying on the 
Earth’s non-renewable resources as commodities and does not encourage or require rethinking of 
the extractivist model and transitioning towards alternative, more ecological, modes of 
development (Ibid.). The federation CONAMAQ25 argues that the new law: “is about 
legitimising the Morales government’s developmentalist agenda” (Ibid.). Morales, however, 
claims to be able to embrace both respect for nature and generate economic growth via 
extraction by rejecting the capitalistic economic model. Instead, coupling inclusion, participation 
of communities, environment and economic growth by:  
 
“providing well-being for everyone, without exclusions. It means respect for the diversity of 
economies of our societies. It means respect for local knowledge. It means respect for Mother 
Earth and its biodiversity as a source of nurture for future generations26” (Morales, 2014).  
 
The duality of extraction and Pachamama is, however, frequently present in Morales’ oral 
representations and speeches (e.g. Morales 2012, Morales, 2014).  
 
With this account for the incorporation of the expanded and empowering citizenship into 
policies, we will continue with a section on the strategy for creating economic development for 
the nation to reduce poverty and promote equality. 
 
                                                 
25
 CONAMAQ, Confederation of traditional governing bodies of highland indigenous communities: National 
Council of Ayllus and Markas of  Qullasuyu, Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu  
26
 Original quote: “generar bienestar para todos, sin exclusiones; significa respetar la diversidad de economías de 
nuestras sociedades; respetar los conocimientos locales y respetar la Madre Tierra y su diversidad biológica, que 
alimentará a las generaciones venideras”. 
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4.3. Economic development through mining 
 
Before going into Bolivia’s extractivist plans, a visit to the socioeconomic situation in Bolivia is 
necessary. The PND presented several goals in 2006, to be achieved in 2011. These goals were 
partly attained, as the table below shows, where gathered data from World DataBank and INE 
(National Institute of Statistics27) are compared to the goals:  
 
Table 2: Socio-economic progress of Bolivia. 
PND Goals for 2011: Data from World Bank and INE
28
: 
An estimated average growth of GDP by 6.3% between 
2006-2011 
Average growth of GDP at 4.67% between 2006-2011 
Decrease in the average poverty rate from 63% to 49.7% Average poverty rate at 45% in 2011 (INE) 
Decrease extreme poverty from 34,5% in 2006 to 27.2% 
in 2011 
Extreme poverty at 20.8% in 2011 (INE) 
Reduce unemployment rate to 4% 3% in 2011 
5.99% in 2010 (INE)  
Per capita income increase from 1,000 USD to 
1,411USD 
1,960 USD in 2011 (Atlas Method) 
1,154 USD in 2011 (Constant USD 2005) 
The gap in income of the richest 10% compared to the 
poorest 10% will decrease from 29 times in 2003 to 21 
times in 2011.  
Poorest 10% share 1% of the national income 
throughout. Richest 10% shared 44% in 2004 but 
34% in 2011.
29
 
Change the energy source of 50% of motorised vehicles  CO2 emissions from 14,910 kiloton in 2006 to 15,456 
kt in 2010
30
.  
Reforestation of half a million hectares.  584,264 square km of forest area in 2006 to 568,884 
square km in 2011. 
 
                                                 
27
 Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
28
 Own elaboration in the right column. We are aware that we have not taken into account specific details about the 
data collection, for example the method of poverty calculation, and therefore we recognize t hat there is an 
uncertainty in these numbers.  
29
 As closest comparable estimate available.  
30
 As closest comparable estimate available. 
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Overall, poverty numbers and unemployment numbers have decreased, while the gross domestic 
product (GDP), equality and per capita income have increased. Additionally, data from the 
World Bank shows that public spending on both health and education has risen significantly 
since 2005. Public spending on education as a percentage of government expenditures peaked in 
2010 with 24% and has come down to 19% in 2011, but this may be attributed to the increasing 
amounts of overall government expenditures rather than a decrease on spending on education.  
Between 2000 and 2006, health expenditures hovered between 50 and 60 USD. After 2006, 
health expenditures have increased consistently and significantly to its current standing at 149 
USD per capita, nearly triple the health expenditures seen in the 2000-2006 timeframe. Thus, it is 
clear that the Morales government has succeeded in creating economic development and social 
improvements on several parameters. On the other hand, environmental parameters have shown 
detrimental effects to the environment with more CO2-emissions and deforestation.  
 
The strategy of the Morales government to create economic growth to finance a welfare reform, 
where the Bolivian population can enjoy an improved standard of living with increased social 
services, is articulated through further extraction and industrialisation of natural resources and 
mining. Natural resources are considered the “patrimony” of Bolivia, a solution to decades of 
dependence and a way towards development and Bolivia does seem to have made progress in 
several aspects. However, has this happened on account of indigenous communities, civil society 
and the environment? 
 
4.3.1. Growth based on Vivir bien and extraction of natural resources 
 
The concept of Vivir bien is also incorporated into the economic national policies with an 
emphasis on the collective over the individual and redistribution of resources: “The Bolivian 
economic model is plural and is oriented to improving the quality of life and the well-being of all 
Bolivians31” (Constitution of Bolivia, article 306) and with emphasis on sustainability and 
harmony between nature and humans where,  
 
                                                 
31
 Original quote: “El modelo económico boliviano es plural y está orientado a mejorar la calidad de vida y el vivir 
bien de todas las bolivianas y los bolivianos”. 
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“the solid links between the Bolivian cultures and the nature is the patrimony of everyone and 
constitutes an enormous comparative advantage in relation to the crisis-laden capitalist 
development model, whose basic equation for development, associated with depredation of 
natural resources and short-termed profits32” (PND, 2006: 11). 
 
In the constitution, as well as in the PND from 2006, the extractive industries play a large role 
and are highly praised for their profit-generating purposes. The role of natural resources is to 
generate profits to be equally distributed to implicit actors and sectors, generate employment and 
create economic diversification (PND, 2006; Constitution of Bolivia, article 355). 
 
It is, however, noted in the plan, that the mining and oil industry are very capital intensive, on 
top of potentially harming nature and the people around it, require long-term investments, 
technology and skilled labour, and that “they have very few linkages to the current national 
production” (PND, 2006: 92). This we will elaborate on in the next chapter. It also speaks 
cautiously of the opportunity to play a more prominent role, which the oil and mining industry 
gives Bolivia, on the international scene. The natural resources attract international attention and 
capital, and Bolivia must make sure, that the country receives its fair share of the benefits of 
extraction (Ibid.: 91-94): “The State shall be responsible for the mineralogical riches that are 
found in the soil and subsoil33” (Constitution of Bolivia, article 369). The national policy intends 
to simultaneously strengthen both the capital intensive strategic sector (extraction) as well as the 
labour-heavy, industrial sector (PND, 2006: 94). In line with this policy goes the intention of 
industrialising the lithium extracted from Salar de Uyuni. According to the theory, linkages 
between the commodity sector and the output structure - in this case the production of batteries 
from lithium - is optimal to diversify an economy and spur development. Rather than letting a 
rent-seeking process take over the extraction of lithium, the PND aims to invest in its own 
natural resources to produce greater-valued goods and reap the benefits they are expected to 
bring. Along with a diversified economy, the theory predicts that there will be greater 
                                                 
32
 Original quote: “Los sólidos vínculos de las culturas bolivianas con la naturaleza son un p atrimonio de todos y 
constituye una enorme ventaja comparativa en relación a un modelo de desarrollo capitalista, cuya ecuación básica 
de desarrollo, asociado a depredación de los recursos naturales con ganancias de corto plazo”.  
33
 Original quote: “El Estado será responsable de las riquezas mineralógicas que se encuentren en el suelo y 
subsuelo”. 
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employment in more sectors locally which will also serve as a safeguard against the vulnerability 
to international price volatility that is present in a purely resource extraction and export process 
and, as we shall see later, is highly relevant in the department of Potosí which to a large extent 
relies on rents from mining. Overall, the governments’ intention of industrialisation of lithium 
can be seen as linkage development as identified by Buur et al. (2013). Outside of economic 
development however, the challenge then lies in how well the PND will be capable of 
maintaining the concept of Vivir bien while simultaneously striving for economic growth in the 
implementation. 
 
4.3.2. The extractive industry and the environment 
 
The development plan applies a holistic approach to the policy of environmental management 
reflected in a vision of taking from the nature only what is necessary for development, and at the 
same time protecting it, which is in accordance with Vivir bien. This approach is stated to be 
cross-disciplinary and applies to all the industrial sectors.  
 
This approach comes as a reaction and resistance to years of natural depredation under the 
neoliberal paradigm, where: 
 
“an unregulated exploitation of its natural resources, which didn’t benefit Bolivia at all, has 
instead enriched only certain groups, who held on to the power under a neoliberal vision, which 
had as its principal development parameter, the attraction and protection of foreign 
investment34” (PND, 2006: 98).   
 
Instead the national plan advocates for:  
                                                 
34
 Original quote: “una explotación incontrolada de sus recursos naturales, que lejos de beneficiar al país, ha 
enriquecido solamente a ciertos grupos que han detentado el poder, bajo la visión de una política neoliberal que fijó 
como principal parámetro de desarrollo la atracción y protección de las inversiones externas”.  
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“a balance between the necessity of development and the conservation of the environment, 
strengthening the role of the State in regards to prevention, control of environmental quality and 
the protection of the natural resources, on a basis of broad social participation35”  
(PND, 2006: 98). 
 
The acknowledgement of the “necessity of development”, however, also suggests a pragmatic 
approach to protection of Pachamama, and “her” rights will be compromised to some extent in 
favour of the human development. Bolivia’s Vice President Alvaro García Linera acknowledges 
in an interview the inherent contradictory tension in the state commitment to environment, 
inclusion and growth in their development model:  
 
“Of course there will be a tension between social-state logic and a sustainable use of nature, 
and the social state needs to generate economic surpluses [...] It involves some tension just as 
this ‘state [composed] of social movements’ generates tensions between the democratisation of 
power [to social movements] and the monopoly of decisions [by the state]” (Linera in 
Bebbington, 2012: 135).  
 
This shows that there are voices within the Morales administration that take up a critical or more 
realistic position opposite to Morales’ rhetoric on the possibility of inclusion of all in his 
development paradigm.  
 
4.4. Mining legislation: Ley de Minería y Metalurgia 2014 
 
A new Bolivian mining law, Ley de Minería y Metalurgia, was passed in 2014 after three years 
of negotiation, heavy debate and even deadly protests. The purpose was to regulate the mining 
sector and align the mining law with The National Development Plan and the 2009 Constitution. 
Its predecessor was a neoliberal mining code from 1997, which was part of the then overall 
national development plan to privatise the national economy directed by structural adjustment 
policies. The mining legislation up until 2014 was regarded as insufficient regarding fiscality and 
                                                 
35
 Original quote: “equilibrio entre la necesidad de desarrollo y la conservación del medio ambiente, fortaleciendo el 
rol del Estado en la prevención, el control de la calidad ambiental y la protección de los recursos naturales, sobre la 
base de una amplia participación social.”  
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keeping control, which manifests itself in poor economical transparency and inefficient 
commercialisation. Furthermore the then-system provided the State with weak legislative tools, 
poor distribution, and low levels of linkages to the communities around the mining sites.  
 
4.4.1. Nationalisation or continuation?  
 
The Bolivian mining sector is comprised of the state, private and cooperative industry. The 
production of foreign companies is concentrated in only a few actors. Except for San Cristóbal 
these companies operate in territories owned by the state mining company, COMIBOL (Mining 
Corporation of Bolivia36), under joint venture contracts or leasing of land. The government made 
these joint venture contracts to make sure capital stays in the country. Cooperatives also work in 
COMIBOL controlled areas under leasing contracts or concessions.  
 
The previously mentioned nationalisation of the mining sector is, however, up until now unseen. 
Foreign companies are responsible for two thirds of extraction of minerals, while cooperatives 
take second place with 21%. The state company COMIBOL only accounts for 3% of the 
extraction (CEDLA37  A, 2014: 2). This division between private companies, cooperatives and 
the state is basically the same as in 2002 (Ibid.). 
 
During the former privatisation of the mining sector there was a huge increase in foreign 
companies in mining. The assessment however is that the law will not change the operational 
environment for foreign companies already established in Bolivia as the new law recognises 
preconstituted rights and agreements, such as the San Cristóbal mine (IHS Online).  
 
The new mining law is in line with the strategy of the PND giving the state the institutional role 
of public agent of the trade and exporting of minerals and metals, which will increase its 
supervision with the mining operations and granted a bigger role in regulating the distribution, 
taxation and control of property rights to areas of extractive significance (IHS Online; PND, 
2006: 91-94). The new law, however, gives companies the rights to use profits as they wish 
                                                 
36
 Corporación Minera de Bolivia 
37
 CEDLA: El Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario. A Latin American NGO for labour and 
agricultural studies.  
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including transfer out of the country. Revenue for private companies can be taken outside the 
country and revenues in cooperatives can be seen as labour income, but revenue from state 
companies must be re-invested (CEDLA A, 2014: 12). This contradicts article 351 of the 
constitution stating that the Bolivian state must make contracts, with either national or foreign 
actors, which ensure, that economic profits made on natural resources must be reinvested in the 
country (Constitution of Bolivia, article 351 II; CEDLA A, 2014: 6).  
 
Interestingly enough, in the discussions prior to the passing of the law, the Ministry of Mining 
suggested that Minera San Cristóbal (MSC) was to enter into a joint venture contract, which 
would entail a tax contribution of 55% or more (LIDEMA, 2013). This would have resulted in a 
huge increase in state income, but as we shall see later, this was not to be the case.  
 
The law states that the natural resources belong to the Bolivian people in their natural state, but 
once processed as products they belong to the companies (CEDLA A, 2014: 5).  
 
According to an analysis by CEDLA, the law will enforce and foster the process of privatisation 
and transfer much state-owned land to private hands. In addition the report states that the law 
does not prioritise domestic industrialisation and does not sufficiently consider indigenous rights.  
Nevertheless, Morales’ comment below contradicts this by highlighting the priority of state 
investments in resource extraction, but also admitting a general lack of public funds to invest in 
the capital-intensive sector, thus legitimising private companies’ presence in Bolivia. 
 
“Bolivian state does not have many funds to invest on them [natural resources], the priority is 
state investment [...] but if there are not investments by the public companies [...] then I don’t 
have any problem with the private companies. On this point there is a different policy, because 
it’s better to have partners than bosses38” (Morales in TVE, 2009). 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Original quote: “el estado boliviano no tiene muchos recursos para invertirlas, la primera prioridad es el inversión 
del estado [...] y so no hay inversión de las empresas de estado [...] las empresas privadas, no tengo ningún 
problema. Por eso hay una política deferida, que mejor tener socios y no patrones”.  
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4.4.2. Mining over water  
 
The law ratifies the right to mining before other activities like agriculture (CEDLA A, 2014). As 
the law establishes minerals as important for strategic public use in accordance with the 
constitution it furthermore establishes that the right to extraction have rights over agricultural 
land, and land can be expropriated (Ibid.: 6). Mining operations have the right to land because it 
is for public use and a state necessity (Ibid.: 10). As mentioned earlier, the law respects the 
concessions given in the past and also the rights given simultaneously. This include the use of 
land, wood and water that exists in or runs through the mining area. The only exception that 
restricts the mining sectors’ water use is if it interrupts the access to public drinking water. 
Mining operations also have the right to surface land and to take control of agricultural land or 
other nature areas to build infrastructure for mining. 
 
4.4.3. Unknown rights for indigenous  
 
The bill was drafted with a consensus-based approach that involved the government and a 
number of interest groups including state mining company COMIBOL, the Ministry of Mines 
and Metallurgy, the Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers union (Federación Sindical de 
Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia: FSTMB), private mining companies represented by the 
Asociación Nacional de Mineros Medianos, the National Mining Chamber (Cámara Nacional de 
Minería), and the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives (Federación Nacional de 
Cooperativas Mineras de Bolivia: FENCOMIN) (IHS Online). It stands out that indigenous 
groups were absent in this. This could indicate that environmental concerns and rights of 
indigenous people affected by the mining operations were to a lesser extent included in the 
process and formulation of the law.  
 
The law has received massive critique from many indigenous federations and organisations such 
as CEDIB39 for being unconstitutional as it privatises water rights to mining operators, it reduces 
the obligation to consultation by affected communities and in relation to this it is criminalising 
demonstrations against mining (Nacla, 2014 (A); CEDLA A, 2014:2, CEDIB Database B, Ley 
                                                 
39
 Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (Center of Documentation and Information Bolivia) 
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de Minería y Metalurgia 2014). The law decreases the possibilities for individuals to pursue 
mining, as individuals are not allowed to extract alone. They have to organise themselves in one 
of the three existing ways: State, private or cooperative. CEDLA criticised this as it forces 
indigenous people to organise themselves in capitalistic forms, which goes against their natural, 
social collective and contrasts the official discourse of socialist communitarianism (CEDLA A, 
2014: 5).  
 
4.5. Sub-conclusion: Inclusion and exclusion 
 
The above sections on the Bolivian government’s political and developmental paradigm 
regarding political ideology, national project, expanded bill of rights and economic policies have 
served to show the inherent contradictions between progressive commitment to indigenous 
rights, pachamama, environment, rhetorical inclusion and participation (in one expression: 
communitarian indigenous socialism), on the one hand, and a dependence of the national 
economy on extraction and mining, as well as exclusion of indigenous rights groups and civil 
rights based organisations in the process of passing legislation on the other. A substantial number 
of Bolivian social movements have stressed the contribution by the continual mega-projects, 
extractive industries and mining corporations to social injustice and climate change in Bolivia 
(Nacla, 2012; Turner, 2014: 64). They have criticised Morales and the Bolivian government's 
neoliberal extractive industries policies for using nationalist rhetoric while exploiting the 
indigenous struggle by using a “cosmovision” discourse (the so-called pachamámico language) 
to conceal neoliberal pro-capitalist economic practices. Some even go as far as claiming that 
capitalist fractions supported and prepared the Morales candidacy to demobilise the growing 
pressure and increases in strikes and blockades from indigenous, rural and workers social 
movements and unions (e.g. the Gas War in 2003 which ousted former president Lozada and the 
Water War in 2000 over the Bolivian government's proposal to privatise water) (Turner, 2014: 
64,65). 
 
A big challenge, and pivotal point of this project, to the Mother Earth Law is Bolivia’s structural 
dependence on extractive industry—with minerals and natural gas constituting 70% of its 
exports, whereof 41% is from mining (Nacla, 2012; Ministerio de Minería y Metallurgía)—and 
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the Morales government’s continued reliance on these sectors to generate state revenues for 
poverty reduction and industrialisation. Can this law coexist with this dependence and plans to 
further expand extraction? Numerous CSO’s criticise the Mother Earth Law for contradictory 
promises because of the government’s two pronged goal of simultaneously enhancing 
environmental protection in alternative development and further extractivist development.  
 
The contradictions, however, are not totally absent in the constitution and the National 
Development Plan. Indirectly, the documents do acknowledge these contradictions by providing 
means of mitigation. The constitution’s article 30 grants indigenous people the right of being 
consulted in regard to extraction on their territory and possible environmental damage of their 
land and crops. Furthermore, it is stated that companies, being national or international, must 
assess, inform about and take measures to prevent environmental damage as well as they are 
obliged, in the mining law, to make damage on nature as limited as possible. 
 
Additionally, how does the right to consultation work, if the degree of consultation is 
questionable - since achieving actual consent is not inscribed in the law as reflected and 
stipulated in the aforementioned UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples? 
Furthermore, how does the prioritisation of mining over agrarian land affect farmers’ 
livelihoods? How does privatisation and “free use” of water affect the environment on a long-
term basis? Finally, does the criminalisation of civic demonstrations comply with the notion of 
deepening democracy?   
 
The following case-analyses will shed light on some of these immanent policy dichotomies and 
see whether the MAS government is capable of equilibrating the ‘necessity of development’ and 
the ‘conservation of environment’ on a ‘basis of broad social participation’.  
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5. The case of the San Cristóbal mine 
 
5.1. Introduction to case analysis 
 
We will in this and in the coming chapter proceed to the analysis of the two cases of mining on 
silver in San Cristóbal and lithium in Salar de Uyuni. The cases will be analysed separately, but 
on the same analytical themes. We will unravel how the political ambitions in the Bolivian 
development model, encompassing both economic growth via mining and also environmental 
and indigenous rights, is reflected in the two cases. This we will do by processing three 
analytical parameters related to our problem formulation and the sub-conclusions derived from 
our previous analysis of the Bolivian development paradigm. Firstly, we will look at the case’s 
Contribution to economic development containing fiscal, consumption and production linkages 
as well as employment. Then we will continue to the Environmental impact and lastly we will 
assess the Inclusion, consultation and indigenous rights in relation to the community’s reactions 
to the mining activity. 
5.1.1. Economic structure of the region 
First, we will give a short introduction to the economy of the region where the two mining 
operations are taking place. Both mines are located in the Department of Potosí, which is divided 
into several municipalities. 
 
The department of Potosí is the poorest department of Bolivia and is highly dependent on rents 
from the mining industry. Minerals account for more than 90% of exports from the region and in 
2010, mining contributed with 38.9 % of the departmental budget (Informe Nacional de 
coyuntura, 2014; Los Tiempos, 2011). We will elaborate on the economic consequences of this 
when analysing the case of mining in San Cristóbal. 
 
However, when looking specifically at the five municipalities surrounding Salar de Uyuni, the 
most important economic activity is actually the production of quinoa which constitutes 61% of 
the regions annual income, 23% comes from salaries and royalties from mining (primarily the 
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San Cristóbal mine), while 14% are from migration and tourism (CEDLA B, 2014: 14; Ströbele-
Gregor 2013: 81).  
 
A study by CEDLA conducted in 2013 estimates the quinoa production of the area based on data 
from the Bolivian agricultural and educational organisations FAUTAPO and ANAPQUI, 
respectively, as well as municipal development plans.  
 
According to this, quinoa production creates an annual income of 92 million USD, equal to 
almost 6,000 USD per family, and it employs around half of the 55,000 inhabitants of the five 
municipalities surrounding Salar de Uyuni (CEDLA B, 2014: 138).  
 
The nature of quinoa cultivation leaves a seven month period each year free from sowing or 
harvest where there is a low demand for labour. During this period many workers migrate in 
search for work and much of this temporary labour is employed in different mining projects of 
which the San Cristóbal mine is the largest and most important. The last important economic 
activity is tourism. In 2012, more than 70,000 tourists, primarily internationals, visited the area, 
which means that tourism brought an annual income of around 6 million USD (CEDLA B, 2014: 
154).  
 
Table 3 gives an overview of estimates of the different incomes in the region (in USD): Column 
titles: Activity, Income from earnings, Income from salaries, Income from royalties and Total 
income (CEDLA B, 2014: 164). 
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Table 3: Different sources of income in the area of the five municipalities surrounding Salar de Uyuni. 
 
Source: CEDLA B 2014: 164. CEDLA’s own elaboration of estimates based on their study. 
 
 
5.2. San Cristóbal case 
 
In this chapter, first, an introduction to the case of silver-zinc extraction at the San Cristóbal mine 
will be given. Then we will conduct an analysis on the themes described above. 
 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The San Cristóbal mine is the largest mine of Bolivia. It contains silver, zinc and lead ore and is 
owned by the Japanese transnational company Sumitomo via its subsidiary Minera San Cristóbal 
(MSC). According to their website, every day it produces some 1,300 tons of zinc-silver ore, and 
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300 tons of lead-silver ore, which makes it the world's third-largest producer of silver and sixth-
largest producer of zinc (Sumitomo website, “Our business”). It also states that MSC has 
invested 1.4 billion USD to date, which constitutes the largest direct foreign investment in 
mining in Bolivia. The initial investments in the mining venture were directed towards 
establishing an infrastructure around the site; the mining camp, plant, mine, highways, bridges 
and a railroad (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014). Even though the first preparations started in the 
1990's, the final construction of the mining site was completed in 2007 and the plant was running 
at full capacity in 2009. The resources in San Cristóbal are expected to be exhausted by 2023 
(Turner, 2014: 67).  
  
The San Cristóbal mine is the only large-scale mine that works on non-COMIBOL ground. In 
1999, the right to conduct mining in the area was transferred to MSC and even today it is the 
property of MSC and not of the state. Thus, the nationalisation (meaning the joint venture 
contracts with COMIBOL) of mining activities has not managed to include the country's largest 
mine.  
 
5.2.2. Contribution to economic development 
 
In the following sections, the economic impact of the San Cristóbal mine will be reviewed in 
terms of the different kinds of linkages and spillovers, which are present. In the first theme, we 
will look at direct fiscal linkages, indirect economic contributions, as well as linkages and 
spillovers in regard to production, consumption and employment. 
  
Direct fiscal linkages 
The San Cristóbal mine is the main source of Bolivia's zinc and silver exports, which, in 2009, 
constituted 60% of Bolivia’s income from hard mineral exports (Turner, 2014: 67). The mine's 
direct contribution to the local and national economy consists respectively of royalties for the 
department and municipality, and corporate income tax for the state. It has not been possible to 
obtain official numbers from MSC in regard to revenue, profit or royalty payment, so we will 
make use of estimates.  
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A CEDLA investigation estimates the average annual revenue for MSC to be 1.6 billion USD of 
which a very large majority is from export (CEDLA A, 2014: 144). The payment of royalties in 
Bolivia is determined as a function of the international prices and the type of commodity. With 
the current prices MSC pays around 5% in royalties for each type of mineral which totals 91 
million USD a year, according to the CEDLA estimate. Of these, 85% goes to the department of 
Potosí while 15% goes to the municipality of Colcha K (Ibid.: 145).  
 
In comparison, a study by Robert Moran published by Energy Press, a news magazine focusing 
on the Latin American energy industry, estimated a royalty payment of 74 million USD in 2011 
(Energy Press, Minando el Agua, 2011). For our purpose, it is then fair to say that MSC pays 
between 70 and 90 million USD in royalties of which most go to the department of Potosí. In 
comparison, the departmental budget for the department of Potosí for 2014 is 197 million USD 
(Department of Potosí, 2014), which means that the direct fiscal contribution to the department is 
close to half of the total budget. In this way, the department of Potosí can, to a large extent, be 
viewed as a monoculture economy as described by Morris et al. 2011, that is highly dependent 
on rents from commodities and therefore vulnerable to international price shocks. The price of 
silver has more than doubled from 2008 to a peak in 2011 but since then it has decreased 
(Ministerio de Mineria y Metalurgia in CEDLA B, 2014: 144). An investigation made by 
Fundacion Milenio, which is an organisation of economic research, argues that the Potosinian 
economy is rising and falling with the prices of minerals and that one of the great challenges of 
Potosí is to diversify its production apparatus making it less dependent on the volatile prices of 
minerals (Fundacion Milenio in Los Tiempos, 2011). This is also suggested in our theory, where 
diversification by industrialisation is the way to avoid the negative consequences of Dutch 
disease and rent-seeking.  
 
It must be noted, that even though the mine accounts for a substantial part of the Potosí 
departmental economy (40-50%) it is still a relatively small part (only 5%) of the company’s 
earnings. This is subject to a perceived unfairness among the population which we will look at 
later.  
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Turning to the company’s contribution for the state, in 2012, MSC paid 281.6 million BOB40 
(around 40 million USD) in tax, which makes it the third largest contributor from the mining 
sector, and the 13th largest tax contributor of the country, though only accounting for 0.8% of 
the total tax base (Impuestos al dia, 2013: 14). In 2012, the state received 277 million USD in 
taxes, royalties and patents from mining (Ministerio de Mineria y metalurgia in Informe de 
Gestion, 2012: 59).   
 
Indirect economic contributions 
MSC represents the largest foreign direct investment in Bolivia and a large part of this is in 
infrastructure. The initial investments were focused on constructing roads, communication lines 
and other necessary infrastructure to conduct large-scale mining and transport large amounts of 
metals. A very specific impact was the relocation of the entirety of the San Cristóbal village in 
1999, which, to a large extent, brought socio-economic improvements to the population of the 
area.  
 
Relocation and improved access to social services 
In 1999, the San Cristóbal town was moved to a site 12 kilometers away to make space for the 
mining activities or as MSC more euphemistically argues; because “the overall safety of the area 
could no longer be guaranteed” (MSC website, Resettlement). The communities residing around 
the mine were relocated as well to the new town of San Cristóbal. According to MSC’s website, 
the company have a long-term commitment to “improve all the residents standards of living” in 
the communities “including sanitation, security, health, infrastructure and housing” (Ibid., 
Moving the town). MSC describes the resettlement as unproblematic, with an emphasis of the 
“company’s commitment to the community, as well as how the community and the company work 
together for the benefit of all involved” (Ibid., Moving the church).  
 
A study that was made on the negotiations between MSC and the surrounding local communities 
and the impact of relocation backs this interpretation (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014). This is 
additionally confirmed in a UN report on the relation between extraction and ethnic minorities in 
Latin America (UN/CEPAL, 2011). MSC had as its primary interest the extraction of minerals, 
                                                 
40
 The currency exchange in the last trimester of 2012 was of 7.0091 BOB for 1 USD. 
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but this was legally and feasibly conditioned on the consent of the local communities. The 
relocation catalyzed internal discussions within the communities as to whether the people wanted 
to move at all; they agreed upon moving, to avoid worsening their current socioeconomic 
conditions, which was characterized by an emigrating youth, lack of employment, high poverty 
and poor infrastructure (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014: 27). The study concludes, as MSC itself 
writes on its website, that the relationship between MSC and the local communities was 
primarily of a positive and mutually beneficent nature. The study by Hernandéz and Moscoso, 
however, states that the relocation of the town of San Cristóbal was also considered difficult for 
a few segments of the community, especially the elderly (Ibid.: 20).  
 
The numbers show great improvements in access to basic and social services for the surrounding 
communities, compared to the time before MSC started their operations. In the table below from 
Hernandéz and Moscoso’s study, the development over 20 years shows a huge increase in access 
to basic services like electricity, potable water, sewerage as well as schooling and a decrease in 
analphabetism (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014). Also there has been a huge decrease in people 
living with dirt floor (piso de tierra), mud walls (pared de adobe) and thatched roofs (techo de 
paja). 
 
Table 4: Access to services in San Cristóbal and in the surrounding villages. 
 
Source: Hernandéz and Moscoso, (2014: 37) based on data from INE. Notes: (1) The percentage of illiterates 
corresponds to the population of 15 or more years of age; (2) The percentage of  out -of-school youth corresponds to 
the population between 6 and 18 years of age; (3) Includes Vila Vila, Culpina K and Rio Grande. 
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It is clear that there has been a remarkable change in the numbers of San Cristóbal from 1992 to 
2001 which points to it resulting from the construction of the new town in 1999. The parallel 
improvements in the other communities could stem from the economical compensations given by 
MSC. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the largest part of this increase can be attributed the 
actions of MSC. The improvements in the period from 2001 to 2012 can hardly be solely 
attributed to MSC but also to state action, improved economic dynamics or other private 
development initiatives (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014). As shown in Table 4, illiteracy has 
decreased from 29.9% in 1992 to 7.6% in 2001. Out-of-school children rate has gone down from 
41.7% to 9% in the same period and the improvements in basic services like lack of access to 
potable water (sin agua potable) and electricity (sin electricidad) has gone down from a 100% in 
1992 to 8.8% and 1.5% in 2012, respectively. The increase in the total population (Población 
Total) of San Cristóbal, as well as the surrounding villages, from a little more than a thousand 
people to more than three thousand underlines the decreasing emigration and increasing 
immigration. 
 
Compensations were given to the people, who, because of the relocation, couldn’t earn their 
living through quinoa farming or llama breeding, during the 17 years of mining. The income for 
some is higher than before and have thus lifted some out of sustenance living.  
 
Furthermore, the study shows that the company provided development assistance in several 
ways. Among the contributions to development were,  
 
“support of local production through technical assistance, training, promoting entrepreneurship 
[...], maintenance and improvement of community infrastructure and basic services. including 
water and waste management and promotion of education and health” (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 
2014: 27). 
 
The authors even argue that MSC is seen more like a public institution than a private company. 
This public and institutional characterisation can be because of the company’s substantial service 
provision and securing socio-economic rights thus undertaking quintessential state 
responsibilities.  
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Linkages and spillovers in regard to labour 
As mentioned in the introduction to the cases, a lot of the temporal labour from agriculture in the 
region, during the seven months between sowing and harvest in quinoa production, goes to the 
mining sector, which is an important source of income for the population of Potosí. MSC directly 
employs 2,000 workers. 550 of these are skilled professional staff, including management, and 
the rest are non-skilled labour (CEDLA A, 2014: 143). According to interviews conducted by 
CEDLA, 70% of the 1,450 non-technical workers are from Uyuni and the surrounding areas. 
This means that for every fifteen families in the region around Salar de Uyuni, there is one 
worker in MSC (Ibid.: 145). They are paid a monthly salary of 3,000 bolivianos (427 USD) 
which is a slightly better pay than the 70-120 bolivianos per day that is the norm for day workers 
in agriculture (Ibid.: 136, 143). However, this is a substantially better pay than the Bolivian 
minimum pay of 1,000 bolivianos per month (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo in 
Informe de Gestión 2012: 23). The 550 professional workers are, however, primarily from 
outside the region or outside the country. 
  
Even though most of the technical staff come from outside the region, MSC directly employs 
local qualified workers and train less qualified people to work at the site. According to locals, 
90% of the workers and 100% of machine operators are from from San Cristóbal and the 
surrounding villages (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014: 31). Thus, there has been a certain spillover 
effect in regard to labour, because local employees have been hired and trained to a higher 
technical level. With this learning comes a greater capacity of the labour force, which could have 
a spillover effect into other areas if the labour moves. However, since mining is often a very 
specific industry, spillover effects between sectors are normally rare. As CEDLA calls it, it may 
be regarded as an ‘enclave activity’ (CEDLA B, 2014).  
MSC is only expected to produce until 2023, thus, enabling the capacitated labour to move is 
essential in creating long-term gain from spillover effects. Mining and agriculture are the largest 
industries in the area and an exchange of knowledge and skills between the two sectors seem 
unlikely because of the specialised nature of mining. But the skills acquired at MSC could easily 
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be transferred to other mining activities in the region (of which there are many) contributing with 
knowledge and know-how. 
 
Production linkages 
There are no significant production linkages connected to the mine, thus, constituting the nature 
of an enclave activity. The only forward production linkage is the very recent purchases of 7,000 
tons of lead concentrate by a new local processing plant, Karachipampa (Metalbulletin, 2014). 
MSC annually produces 600,000 tons of concentrate (MSC, Production) why the amount sold to 
Karachipampa hardly qualifies as a strong production linkage.  
 
When disregarding this small production link, all of the commodities from MSC are exported to 
Chile and overseas for processing. A development of forward production linkages in the shape of 
processing and industrialisation of primary commodities into products could theoretically have 
great importance for the Bolivian economy. As the production sector is often more labour-
intensive than extractive industries, this could potentially bring employment, as well as added 
value to the products. In this way, an industrialisation (as is the plan in regard to lithium) could 
result in a very large income for the state as well. The lack of production linkages, as well as the 
relatively low fiscal contribution to the state and local government, has also been subject to 
protests. 
  
5.2.3. Environmental impact  
 
The mining law of 1997 allowed for corporations to consume unlimited quantities of water 
without providing compensation. This right was ratified in the mining law of 2014, where 
mining, as a strategic activity, is granted the right of using water, as long as it does not affect 
drinking water for the communities. According to Turner, the mining activity leaves the villages 
surrounding San Cristóbal facing challenges with water shortage and a contaminated water 
supply leaving the water undrinkable. If this is true, it is contradictory to the government’s 
official stance on water-management as water is now inscribed in the new Bolivian constitution 
as being a human right and a public good (Turner, 2014: 67, 68). Additionally, if it affects the 
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quality of drinking water and not only the general water supply, it even violates the modest 
regulations in the new mining law.   
 
In a study for the Bolivian non-profit environmental organisation, LIDEMA (The League of 
Defense of the Environment41), Robert E. Moran performed an autonomous investigation of the 
impact on water-resources in the area around the San Cristóbal mining site. According to this, 
MSC consumes between 42,000 and 50,000 cubic meters of underground water a day equal to 
486 liters per second. Moran argues, that these aquifers will remain void and won’t get refilled 
by rain or snow for decades after MSC has left, which leaves no room for alternative use of the 
resource, thus, making the operation not just mining of minerals but of water as well (Petropress, 
2011). This slow refill could categorise the water in San Cristóbal as a very slowly renewable 
resource. LIDEMA additionally states that only 18% of the water is recycled. Furthermore, the 
draining of these aquifers will lead to surrounding rivers and lakes to dry up as well, causing 
damage to the fragile ecosystem and biodiversity. This, in turn, might affect the other sectors of 
work like herding and breeding, agriculture and tourism. Finally, the chemical contaminants and 
debris of the mining operation has contaminated the nearby lake Wila Kara and can contaminate 
underground water in the long term (LIDEMA, 2008). Moran is highly critical of MSC’s own 
impact studies, which, according to him, are scientifically deplorable and scarce of 
comprehensive data. For instance, MSC never performed a baseline study of the water quality 
prior to the extraction, which makes it impossible to measure any change in quality. According 
to MSC, the water quality in the aquifers was never of a potable or irrigative nature, but other 
institutions give contradictory evidence (Petropress, 2011). Furthermore, Moran criticises the 
high-tech extraction method of MSC’s open pit mining, which harms the environment to a much 
larger degree than traditional mining. Moran explicitly criticises the structural conditions under 
which the company thrives and points out the potential internal conflict of interest within the 
Bolivian state: 
  
“It remains clear that the mining industry has a very favourable strategic and economic 
relationship with the Bolivian government, why inherent conflicts of interest arise, when 
                                                 
41
 Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente 
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an agency like the Ministry of Environment and Water tries to regulate the exploitation of 
the environment and water with MSC42” (Petropress, 2011). 
 
MSC and Sumitomo explicitly describe their many initiatives and programmes mitigating and 
minimising environmental effects of their mining operation. On top of this, MSC has acquired 
several certificates of good standards from the ISO (The International Organisation for 
Standardisation). It has received respectively ISO 9001 (quality management practices including 
working environment and conditions43), ISO 14001 (environment)44, OHSAS 18001 (safety and 
health) and ISO/EIC 27001 (information security) (Erbol.com, 2014; MSC, About us). The ISO 
14001,  
 
“addresses various aspects of environmental management. It provides practical tools for 
companies and organizations looking to identify and control their environmental impact and 
constantly improve their environmental performance.” (ISO, 2014). 
 
They describe in detail that their operations are in accordance with Bolivian law, and that they 
are monitoring and reporting to the government on various environmental factors and their own 
seemingly ambitious and comprehensive environmental management systems including air 
quality inspections, soil rehabilitation programs, continuous monitoring and evaluation water 
programs while acknowledging the unique ecology of their operation area and the communities 
dependence and cultural relation to it. The company is on its website rearticulating a moderate 
version of the aforementioned indigenista discourse and is additionally trying to construct an 
image of itself  as a progressive, environmentally protective and concerned company, as part of 
their social corporate responsibility strategy. Bolivia as a correspondent member45 of ISO can 
                                                 
42
 Original quote: “Queda claro que la industria minera tiene una relación económica y estratégica especialmente 
favorable con el gobierno boliviano, por lo cual se presentan conflictos de intereses inherentes cuando alguna 
agencia còmo el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Aguas trata de regular el uso ambiental y de aguas en MSC”,  
43
 This is however quite vaguely described as it only demands standards for physical working environment and the 
assessment’s focus is placed at the condition of the end product. The organisation must determine and manage the 
work environment needed to achieve the conformity of product requirements, which entails considerations 
concerning lighting, noise, temperature or humidity (ISO 9001:2008, Clause 6.4). 
44
 According to WB 13.8 % of Bolivian firms had acquired internationally -recognised quality standards in 2006, 
while increased to 22.4% in 2010  (World Bank 2014).  
45
 Bolivia is a category 2 member of ISO, called a Corresponding Member, meaning they take up an observer's 
position with the right to observe the development of ISO standards and strategy and attend ISO policy meetings as 
observers.  
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sell and adopt ISO International Standards nationally as has been done to MSC (ISO, members). 
The certifications are given and thereafter assessed and verified by annual audit by an external 
certification body (a “Bureau Veritas”), a private company in the country authorised to conduct 
ISO audits. The purpose of the ISO audits is not to gauge actual environmental impact, but 
serves to assess the functionality and quality of the management systems put into place to 
minimise environmental impact. It can, therefore, be questioned whether the ISO standard only 
ascertains the use of systems and not the level of quality of them, or whether the right parameters 
and areas are measured to secure this quality. An additional critique, which applies to internal 
standards in general, also applies to ISO, as it represents global consensus on good practices, but 
they are, as with most international standards, not legally binding without existence of an appeals 
committee and possible sanctions other than rejecting to renew certification.  
 
If the serious and damaging consequences presented in the reports by Moran and LIDEMA, 
regarding the unsustainability of the water consumption and contamination, are true, this means 
that San Cristóbal is in fact undermining future agrarian and breeding industries and developing 
projects in the area. This does not correlate with MSC’s mantra of minimising long-term 
environmental consequences and letting “the communities be protagonists in their own 
development by not creating dependency on MSC and to create long-term development” 
(Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014: 27). In addition, this both shows that both legal policies, e.g. the 
mining law, as well as practice is not compatible with the so-called pachamámico language 
about respect for indigenous perceptions of Pachamama, and the environmental compassion 
articulated by the government and the constitution.  
 
5.2.4. Inclusion, consultation and indigenous rights 
  
In this analytical section, we will touch upon the relocation of the surrounding communities, 
access to social services, socio-economic consequences of the mining, critique from civil society 
organisations and protests. 
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As mentioned in the paragraph on indirect economic contributions, according to the study by 
Hernandéz and Moscoso, the living conditions for the people of San Cristóbal have improved on 
many parameters. In the study, MSC expresses that the key to their successful relationship was 
the ability to “listen” and that: “if we want to understand the rural areas, we have to de-
westernize ourselves” (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014: 31), which resembles the Bolivian state’s 
constitutional responsibility to secure consultation and cultural rights. This exemplifies how 
MSC draws heavily, in addition to the environmental discourse, on corporate social 
responsibility and human rights principles - constructing itself as a company with comprehensive 
respect for indigenous rights and culture by applying policies of anti-discrimination, 
transparency, mutual respect, community dialogue and by following international standards.  
 
Negative socioeconomic consequences 
The current situation of the San Cristóbal inhabitants has improved on many parameters, but not 
all. The income for some is higher than before and have, thus, lifted some out of sustenance 
living. There seems to be less emigration and more immigration, which has caused the 
surrounding villages to grow in size. Concerns about the environment and contamination were 
expressed by the locals along with the fact that the company only stays for a limited amount of 
time, which calls for independent measures of maintaining sustainable development. The 
distance to the farmers’ ranches are now longer, thus making agriculture and breeding of 
livestock more difficult (Hernandéz & Moscoso, 2014: 34). 
 
If the mining activities reduce the possibilities for and capabilities in agriculture by consuming 
and polluting water and soil, moving the town further from fertile grounds and employing 
farmers in mining with better pay, this can have severe long-term effects on the local economy 
when the mining adventure ends in less than ten years. Parallels can be drawn (though on a local 
scale) to features of the Dutch disease, where heavy investments in extractive industries attract 
labour from manufacturing and agriculture, thus, reducing the capability within these and 
focusing the economy on production of primary commodities, which leads to severe challenges 
in transforming the economy back to the traditional sectors after the depletion of resources.  
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Civil society and popular protests 
Several Bolivian civil organisations have condemned the San Cristóbal operation on the grounds 
of capitalist exploitation (due to the low percentages of tax paid) and the environmental 
consequences of the open pit mining and massive water consumption (Rojas in Pagina Siete, 
2014; Ocmal, 2013). CONAMAQ46, a confederation of different indigenous communities 
organisations, denounces transnational companies extracting minerals on their ground. They 
assert that the neoliberal model of mining is still present in Bolivia and they highlight the 
disproportionately small amount of taxes being paid by the companies, compared to their 
revenue. They focus their critique towards three transnational companies; San Cristóbal, Illapa 
and San Bartolomé of which the first is the largest and most significant (Conflictos Mineros, 
2013). In their opinion, natural resources should be completely nationalised, but in their eyes the 
government is still protecting the transnational companies like MSC, and they claim that the role 
of the state in mining operation has diminished. CONAMAQ is opposed to open-pit mining 
because they see it as a destruction of the environment and Pachamama. According to them, the 
current use of resources is not an exit from poverty referring to the town of Potosí that is rich in 
mining and where people still live in extreme poverty (Conflictos Mineros, 2013). In line 
herewith, it is further criticised that the extraction does not benefit the Potosinians: 
 
"When we talk about the richness of natural resources in Potosí, there are very few who make 
profit from what is generated, and in economy this is called surplus. Who are those that take the 
large part of this surplus? Those are the transnational companies. Mining generates little 
income for the state” (Rojas in Pagina Siete, 2014). 
 
Here, CONAMAQ is drawing on the exact same discourse as Morales, regarding the necessity of 
both nationalisation and industrialisation of the extraction industry, but they point to the total 
lack of implementation. An interesting point is, however, that CONAMAQ here both mourn 
mining’s fatal impact on Pachamama, representing the indigenista discourse, while still adhering 
to economic growth based on natural resources, as long as it is according to a socialist and 
environmental model of redistribution and sustainability. The organisation accuses the 
                                                 
46
 Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu). It 
represents different indigenous communities in, among the others, Cochabamba and Potosí. 
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government for double standards, because the private companies are increasingly granted 
ineligible rights, at the expense of people and Pachamama, which he claims to represent. 
Morale’s discursive construction of himself as representing a new, radical and all-inclusive 
citizenship, encompassing the poor and indigenous and redressing discrimination and injustice, is 
here highly challenged. Morales is then accused of reiterating the traditional constructing of 
Agamben’s People at the expense of a number of excluded people. 
 
These condemnations also took the shape of physical demonstrations. In April 2010, the most 
significant protests took place and protesters blockaded the main railway of the mine, 
demonstrating against the environmental violations, and particularly the water exploitation and 
the fact that MSC does not pay for the water they consume, and demanding expanded services 
such as electricity, drinking water and infrastructures (Reuters 1/Reuters 2). The protesters were 
local residents, indigenous groups and peasants, and not company workers, who demanded 
compensation for environmental damages and increased protection of the nature. Their two-
pronged goal resembles Morales’ promises and ambitions to protect the environment, restore 
indigenous groups’ control over natural resources and increase their share in extraction revenues 
and royalties. In line with CONAMAQ, the protesters challenge Morales’ development model 
and self construction of him and his government. Another interesting point is the fact that, as 
previously mentioned, only a certain amount of villages around San Cristóbal are enjoying the 
benefits provided in the form of services of MSC. As Mario Manami Morales, civic commitee 
president of Nor Lipéz, says in a chronic from 2014:  
 
“It is seen, that the private companies never think of getting the people in the surrounding area 
out of poverty. There is a big difference between those who live very close to the village [San 
Cristóbal] and those who live a few kilometers away47” (Mamani Morales, 2014).  
 
When only certain populations around the San Cristóbal mine reap the benefits of the company’s 
services, this asymmetric distribution could create social inequalities, which could have spurred 
the demonstrations. In this relation, it is relevant to notice that the company employees did not 
                                                 
47
 Original quote: “está visto que los privados nunca piensan en sacar de la pobreza a la gente que está en 
alrededores de la empresa, existe mucha diferencia entre quienes están dentro del cerco milimetrado de este pueblo y 
los que viven a pocos kilómetros”. 
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participate in the blockades, which could be due to fear of losing their job or them accessing a 
higher level of benefits from the mining operations than by demonstrating. The citizens express, 
that they are experiencing the exact thing, which the government’s development policies are to 
eliminate, the social inequality and exclusion of the poor and indigenous. This asymmetry could 
be further exacerbated by the notion of a perceived inequality that develops when locals 
experience the stark contrast between the amount of revenue MSC make compared to the poverty 
of the region.  
 
Sumitomo’s official news release during the protests shifted the responsibility on the 
government, affirming that the company operates respecting Bolivian laws for the environment 
and calling for a direct intervention of the central government to solve the situation (Sumitomo, 
2010). The protests ended when an agreement with the department’s governor was found, to 
create a roundtable and discuss the demands of the protesters. Different members of the 
government said that the law for the regulation of water consumption had to be changed (but that 
has never been done) (Business News Americas, 2010; Telesurtv, 2010). 
 
These protests clearly and explicitly showed the opposition - and in their perception the trade-off 
- between the strong rhetoric of environmental protection, inclusion of indigenous groups and 
redistribution of wealth of Morales’ government48, and the environmental and socioeconomic 
consequences of the mega-projects in the mining industry such as in San Cristóbal. In the case of 
San Cristóbal, Morales’ ambitious goals of creating a broad inclusive citizenship comprised of 
both the poor and indigenous is not supported by the affected communities and the organisations 
representing them.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The protests started the week before The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother 
Earth, taking place in Cochabamba (19-22 April 2010), strongly wanted by Morales government as a response to the 
supposed failure of  the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (the Copenhagen Summit, 7-18 
December). 
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5.2.5. Sub-conclusion: San Cristóbal 
 
There is no doubt as to whether MSC has contributed to a large degree to the structural 
development of the communities around the mine. The resettlement of the San Cristóbal village 
and the investments in infrastructure has brought better living conditions for around 3,000 
people.   
 
With its 2,000 employees, the mine is the largest single source of employment in the region and 
has the important role of employing the temporary labour that comes from agriculture. The 
employment creates a direct linkage to local economy as well as providing some spillovers in the 
sense of training employees and transferring know-how and knowledge. Linkages and spillovers 
in the shape of learning and capacity building as well as programs of entrepreneurship are crucial 
for ensuring long-term development in the area. MSC have brought both, but to a limited extent, 
and whether they can be used for developing new ways of generating income is uncertain.  
 
MSC also offers a very large direct fiscal contribution to the department and the municipalities, 
which exemplifies the resource dependency of the region. This makes the economy vulnerable 
because of the fact that the minerals are non-renewable resources and that the extraction is time-
limited. Therefore, diversification of the economic sector is crucial, and for a stronger industrial 
sector, production linkages are important. Even though a small Bolivian company is beginning to 
process commodities from the mine, most of the minerals are being exported directly and 
processed abroad, leaving very few production linkages.  
 
MSC has had a significant negative impact on the environment. The massive water consumption 
and contamination will have negative consequences for future development, especially if the 
locals will have to revert to agriculture - the most important source of income in the region. As 
MSC is only expected to operate less than ten more years it is important that the people of the 
region can go back to cultivation of crops or find new ways to sustain themselves.  
 
Additionally, we see that there is a heavy trade-off between the economic contribution MSC 
makes to the local and national economy, and the company’s impacts on the area and especially 
68 
 
the environment in which it operates. In this way, Morales’ construction of a socialist, radical 
and inclusive Bolivia seems to not be reflected in the case of San Cristóbal. The company’s large 
exports, few linkages and relatively small (compared to revenue) contribution to the local 
economy does not align well with Morales’ intentions of Bolivia taking control of the country’s 
resources, thus benefitting and including the Bolivian people. This has also been subject to 
protests, primarily by those not employed in the mine, and thus excluded from the benefits.  
 
The private company does not seem structurally affected by the discourses of Morales. On the 
contrary, it has adopted terms and concepts from the development model and used them as their 
own. The surrounding communities have indeed experienced better access to social services and 
infrastructure, but these are, however, perceived as being unequally distributed on a local as well 
as national scale. The services are in addition unsustainable as the company will withdraw their 
operations and the services are not being provided in the realm of state responsibility. 
Furthermore, the environmental degradation of MSC’s operation is not perceived as sustainable 
in the sense that future activities or development will suffer from worsened conditions.  
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6. The case of lithium in Salar de Uyuni 
 
In this chapter, we will first give a short historical and contextual introduction to the case of 
lithium mining in Bolivia and second, an analysis will be made following the same focus areas 
and analytical themes as in the case of San Cristóbal. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Salar de Uyuni is the world’s largest salt desert. In the 1980’s, shallow test drillings to a depth of 
11 metres, made by French researchers, estimated that there were 8.9 million tons of lithium to 
be found underneath the desert. This amount alone makes Salar de Uyuni the largest lithium 
reserve in the world. In the year 2000, American researchers from Duke University drilled to a 
depth of 220 metres without hitting the bottom of the lithium reserve. Based on these drillings, 
the GNRE, Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporiticos, which is the agency under COMIBOL 
that is responsible for extracting the lithium, now estimates the reserve to be of no less than 100 
million tons of lithium (GNRE, 2010: 35-36). This is still to be confirmed by other researchers, 
however.  
In any of these estimates, the lithium represents a very large economical potential for the region 
which is one of the least developed in Bolivia. Its importance has also been confirmed by the 
new constitution, which specifically attributes a “strategic character for the country” to the 
category of non-metallic resources which lithium is a part of and main contributor to 
(Constitution of Bolivia, article 369, II).  
During the 1980's and 1990's several plans for extracting the lithium was put forward with 
different degrees of international participation but all including private transnational companies 
as the primary contractor. In 2010, the GNRE presented the national strategy for extracting and 
industrialising the valuable resource. The strategy represents a total state investment of 904 
million USD and includes three phases (Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgía in Informe de 
Gestión, 2012: 65): 
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1. Phase: To be reached in 2012. Budget of 19 million USD. Investigation, research, tests and a 
pilot scale production of 40 tons of lithium per month and 1,000 tons of potassium per month in 
two pilot plants.  
● Status: In the time of assessment (August 2013) the two pilot plants were operational and 
produced a little less than three tons of lithium per month and 200 tons of potassium per 
month according to the general of GNRE, Luis Alberto Echazú. This underproduction is 
partly due to delays in the signing of contract and disbursement of investments from the 
Central Bank of Bolivia (CEDLA B, 2014: 6). 
 
2. Phase: To be reached in 2016. Budget of 485 million USD. This phase includes reaching 
industrial production scale of 30,000 tons of lithium a year and 700,000 tons of potassium a year. 
It also includes design and construction of the infrastructure which includes construction of 
roads, communication lines, drinking water, electricity, pools of evaporation, etc. 
● Status: GNRE are expecting to enter into full industrial production scale in 2017, a year 
later than originally planned. In 2015, 137 million USD will be invested in different 
infrastructure projects in Salar de Uyuni, which makes it the fifth largest infrastructure 
investment in the country (Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Públicas, general budget 
2015). 
 
3. Phase: To be reached in 2014. Budget of 400 million USD. The industrialisation and 
commercialisation of lithium. This includes construction of two pilot plants for production of 
lithium ion batteries and cathode materials. For this third phase, international actors will be 
included to ensure the capacity of technology. 
● Status: GNRE-COMIBOL has entered into cooperation with a Chinese and a South-
Korean company to construct two pilot plants. One is already operational, since the 
beginning of 2014, and the other was expected to be operational in April 2014 (CEDLA 
B, 2014: 91). The two plants are, however, dependent on the production of lithium to 
reach expected levels.  
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Among other things, lithium and potassium are used for making batteries and cathode materials 
for electronic portable devices, such as mobile phones and laptops and for electric vehicles. In 
the past eight years the demand for lithium has increased with an average of 7-9% per year. In 
the projection for 2010-2025 it is set to increase with an average of 10.4% annually (CEDLA B, 
2014: 73). Especially, the expected increase in production of electric cars from 2020 is the 
reason for the expected increase in demand for lithium (Ströbele-Gregor, 2013).  
 
6.2. Contribution to Economic Development 
 
In this section the linkages from the extraction and production of lithium to the local community 
will be reviewed. We will look at direct fiscal linkages, indirect economic contributions, as well 
as linkages and spillovers in regard to production, consumption and employment.  
 
Direct Fiscal Linkages.                                                                                                           
Lithium is not traded on the international exchange market. Instead prices are often negotiated 
directly and therefore there is no fixed price, but the current value is estimated around 5,000 
USD per ton of lithium and 400 USD per ton of potassium. When the plants reach their industrial 
production expectations, GNRE predicts an annual state revenue of 430 million USD (GNRE 
2010: 72). It is not yet decided how these revenues will be distributed but a proposition from 
2010, even though it was not passed, might indicate some levels (Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 64). 
First of all, it suggests that all income for the first five years will be reinvested in the project. 
Thereafter, earnings will be distributed as follows (CEDLA B, 2014: 97): 
● 25% For the five different municipal governments around Salar de Uyuni. 
● 23% Reinvested in the project 
● 20% For the department of Potosí 
● 20% National Treasury 
● 10% COMIBOL 
● 2% Center of Investigation for the Industrialisation of Evaporites of Bolivia 
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According to this plan, the extraction of lithium (from the pilot as well as the processing plants) 
will have a significant impact on the local economy. 25% of the income will be distributed for 
the five local municipalities. According to Table 3 produced by CEDLA on the previous page, 
the lithium project will lead to an annual income of around 62 million USD directly to the region 
of Salar de Uyuni (excluding income from employment which is analysed in the next section). 
Furthermore 20% will go to the department of Potosí. In this sense the income from lithium 
production and industrialisation has vast potential for generating rents for the department and 
municipalities. As these linkages are purely economic they come without spillover effects. 
However, when industrialisation and production of actual batteries begin, the economy will 
move from primary commodities to the productive sector, thus serving as a safeguard against 
volatile international commodity prices.  
 
Indirect economic contributions                                                                                                
When looking at linkages, we also have to include indirect contributions to the local society. At 
present, the basic services for the inhabitants of the five municipalities of Salar de Uyuni are 
very limited and below the Bolivian average. Only 53% have access to potable water, 29% have 
electricity and 34% have access to gas for cooking (CEDLA B, 2014: 130). With the project of 
industrialising lithium comes heavy investments in infrastructure, as described above in the 
second phase of the strategy. This will create development within water supply, electricity, gas 
and asphalt roads as well as within health facilities and schools (Ibid.: 59). It is important, 
however, to mention that the exploitation of lithium will have a severe impact on the production 
of quinoa and might affect tourism as well (Ibid.: 58; Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 71-72). Thus, there 
is a trade-off between the lithium project and the traditional economic activities. We will revert 
to this in section 6.   
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Linkages and spillovers in regard to labour                                                                             
Mining is generally characterised by being very capital-intensive and with a low demand for 
labour, as also described in the theory chapter (3.2). This is also true in the case of lithium. At 
the moment there are only 270 people employed in the lithium project including workers, 
technical and administrative staff. According to the projections from the Ministry of Mining and 
Metallurgy, in 2019, there will be 1,000 direct employees in the project (CEDLA B, 2014: 95). 
This will mostly be in the form of employees with high or medium qualifications, given the 
technical nature of the lithium extraction and production. Because of the low degree of skilled 
labour in the region it seems plausible to expect that most of the labour will come from outside. 
However, the visit from CEDLA in 2013 to the pilot plant in Llipi shows that there actually is 
local unskilled labour that are being trained for technical positions (Ibid.: 57). In this way, the 
linkages in regard to employment are not high in quantity but they do bring spillovers in the form 
of technical knowledge and capacity building of local labour. Given the low level of education in 
the area this is to be considered a significant qualification and capacity building, which, 
according to Morrissey (2012), constitutes a key aspect in further development.  
 
There is also a significant number of indirect employment and consumption linkages. According 
to the assessment of CEDLA, this is even more difficult to predict, but there will be a certain 
indirect employment resulting from the consumption in other sectors created by the project. 
Based on the projections of the Ministry in 2019 there will be 4,000 people employed in 
secondary activities who will most likely come from the areas surrounding Salar de Uyuni. The 
indirect employment is primarily related to the activity around lithium production including 
construction of infrastructure, transport, provision of food etc. There will also be people coming 
from outside the region, both skilled and unskilled labour and the migration of people will also 
bring economical activities in the form of schools, health, banking, amusement and the like 
(CEDLA B, 2014: 57, 95). The employment of course creates economic development for the 
people, but they do not bring with them qualitative spillover effects. The secondary activities are 
in basic areas and do not create learning or qualification of the labour force in the region. 
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Production linkages and spillovers 
Production linkages are a very important factor in the case of lithium in Bolivia. The whole focus 
of the strategy is not to export the primary commodity of lithium, but to industrialise and process 
it to add value by turning it into the final product, which is actual ion batteries. Here we will look 
at the direct input and output for the project. The data which we have been able to collect in 
regard to this is not extensive, but we will draw out a few examples.  
 
The basic necessities for the extraction of lithium, besides the aforementioned infrastructure 
investments, is primarily the construction of evaporation pools, thus making the backward 
linkages quite limited. The most important feature of the lithium extraction is the forward 
linkage created in the industrialisation of the commodity.  
 
This linkage comes with a certain spillover in relation to the technology needed for this. 
Currently, Bolivia does not possess the necessary technology to enter into phase 3 without 
support from outside the country (Echazú in Energy Press, 2011). The material and technology 
for battery production come from Chinese and South-Korean companies. This will bring 
spillovers to the Bolivian technical staff in the sense that they learn the methods and techniques 
of producing batteries and will create a qualification of the national mining company COMIBOL 
and bring technological capacity to Bolivia as a country (CEDLA B, 2014: 57). 
 
This forward linkage can be described as very deep, since it adds value to the commodity by 
adding nodes of processing along the lithium chain within the country. The industrialisation of 
lithium will create greater valued products to a much higher extent than the exportation of an 
unprocessed commodity. Indirectly, unless value-adding nodes are implemented into other 
sectors other than lithium - such as manufacturing of other commodities - the depth of linkages 
will mainly be reserved for the lithium chain.  
 
Looking at the breadth of direct linkages, on the other hand, the range of products needed will be 
limited to the range that lithium extraction and battery manufacturing will need. To begin with, 
the linkages created under one sector will not have great breadth but may expand more and more 
if spillovers occur into other sectors and new production linkages appear, something that may not 
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happen at all in a pure fiscal linkage. Indirectly however, the breadth of linkages may expand, 
especially within consumption linkages, as demand rises for services to provide for the local 
workforce.  
 
 
6.3. Environmental impact 
 
The southern highland of Bolivia, and especially the salt flats located at almost 4,000 meters of 
altitude, is a very fragile ecosystem. Mining activity always comes with a certain environmental 
impact and here we will assess the expected environmental impact for the people living in and 
around the salt desert.  
 
“[...] the large water consumption in relation to the extraction and processing of lithium, but 
especially the contamination of subterranean water sources as a result of the chemicals used for 
treatment of lithium, represents a great danger for the agriculture and livestock in the region49” 
(Hollender/Schultz, 2010 in Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 49). 
 
Especially two features of the exploitation of lithium are relevant; the production of toxic sludge 
and the use of water. Both will have a significant impact on the fauna and flora and especially on 
the quinoa production (CEDLA B, 2014: 28; Aguilar, 2009; Ströbele-Gregor 2012). The 
environmental damage comes in the process of separating the lithium from magnesium. This 
process is called 'liming' and produces a toxic sludge that contains a very high degree of 
magnesium. According to CEDLA, this toxic sludge constitutes: "a very serious and dangerous 
environmental threat for the fragile ecosystem, the biodiversity and the rural communities of the 
southern highland of Bolivia50” (Ibid.). According to Echazú, the general of GNRE, this method 
will only be used to reach 60% of the planned production. But even this will create 730,000 tons 
of toxic sludge per year damaging the ecosystem and the soil and potentially thereby also the 
quinoa production. According to the CEDLA report the magnitude of the potential damage to 
                                                 
49
 Original quote: “el alto consumo de agua en relación a la extracción y el procesamiento del litio, pero 
especialmente también la contaminación de las aguas subterráneas por el uso de químicos en el tratamiento del litio, 
representan un gran peligro para la agricultura y la ganadería de la región”. 
50
 Original quote: “Una muy grave y peligrosa amenaza ambiental para el frágil ecosistema, la biodiversidad y las 
comunidades rurales del altiplano sur boliviano”. 
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quinoa production is very difficult to assess at the moment but a certain impact is unavoidable 
(CEDLA B, 2014: 30). Echazú, however, reject that the environmental damage of lithium 
extraction will as big as the CEDLA investigation predicts (GNRE, 2014). 
The other severe environmental impact is the immense usage of water that mining requires. 
The Bolivian highland that covers 13% of the country has only 0.5% of the country’s water 
resources (Escobari in Aguilar, 2009: 12).  
 
"...water resources in the Salar de Uyuni Watershed are considered a non-renewable resource 
(or renewed extremely slow) and specifically expanding mining industry may lead to ruin this 
sensitive ecosystem and also provide a threat to the region's water supply."  (Aguilar, 2009: 12). 
 
Aguilar argues that due to the limited water resource, water consumption for lithium extraction 
and crop irrigation cannot take place simultaneously. GNRE predicts that for industrial 
production of lithium there will be a water usage of 420,000 cubic meters per month (GNRE in 
CEDLA B, 2014: 105). It is also not possible to predict the actual impact of this water 
consumption, partly because the plans for recycling are not in place and it is not known how 
much of the water for mining that is actually drinkable or suitable for irrigation in the first place.  
 
According to a study by Molina in 2007, it is, however, reasonable to expect the same damages 
that have been seen in the salt desert of Chile, nearby, where lithium extraction has been going 
on for years. These damages include the decline of water aquifers and the degradation of 
wetlands and lakes with concomitant negative effects on wildlife. They also include decrease and 
disappearance of llama herds and thereby they will have socio-economic and cultural 
implications on those relying on livestock. Also drinking water will be affected (Ströbele-
Gregor, 2012: 50). Even though the actual impact on water resources is difficult to assess, there 
is a perception among locals, that changes are happening, and that it is a result of either damage 
from mining (both lithium and also the San Cristóbal mine is being mentioned) or from global 
climate changes. It is the perception that the periods of rainfall are decreasing, and droughts are 
common, affecting quinoa production and livestock. These perceptions can give an indication of 
just how severe the current water situation is, which means that possible further drought and 
decrease in water supply will further deteriorate the conditions for the community's mean of 
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sustenance resulting in emigration, as expressed by a farmer close to the lithium plant: “We are 
suffering a drought of three years. Many people from my community has emigrated to Chile in 
search for jobs until the rain returns51” (Hollender/Shultz, 2010: 46 in Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 
47). Another farmer adds: “The llama breeders complain about disappearing surface water, 
which they are counting on to sustain their animals52” (Ibid.). In 2011, a drought destroyed 7% 
of the crops in seven municipalities around the Salar de Uyuni (Viceministerio de Defensa Civil, 
2010 in Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 49). It is, however, not possible to connect this drought directly 
to mining activities.  
 
Even though the exact damage to the ecosystem and the quinoa production from the water usage 
and the toxic sludge is difficult to assess, both the predictions and the experience of mining 
activity in general ensures that there will be an impact. This constitutes the dichotomy that is the 
focus of this report; that the possible economic development comes at a price for the 
environment, and possible improved living conditions for the larger population, thanks to the 
revenues from mining, come at a price for the minority locals living in the area. According to 
CEDLA, the lithium extraction "risks producing a major environmental disaster for the region”. 
At the same time, however, it creates “a lot of employment and a significant expansion to the 
economy in the region53” (CEDLA B, 2014: 59). In the constitution and the mining law, as 
mentioned in chapter 4, natural resources are an important factor in contributing to the overall 
development in Bolivia, and therefore it must be accepted that there is a certain environmental 
damage. According to the constitution, the extractor is, however, required to mitigate and limit 
the damage. 
 
According to GNRE themselves, they are obliged to respect the national and local environmental 
regulations, optimise the water and energy consumption, minimise the creation of residuals and 
dispose of them in an adequate way, improve the working environment and continuously conduct 
research in cleaner technology. If this policy is realised they will have completed several 
                                                 
51
 Original quote: “Estamos sufriendo de una sequía de tres años que ha obligado a la mayoría de los productores a 
volcarse a actividades de turismo o de minería. Mucha gente de mi comunidad ha emigrado a Chile en busca de 
trabajo hasta que regrese la lluvia”  
52
 Original quote: ”Los criadores de llamas se quejan de la desaparición del agua superficial con la que cuentan para 
pastar sus animales” 
53
 Original quote: “arriesga a producir un desastre ambiental regional mayor [...] generando mucho empleo y una 
significativa ampliación de la economía monetaria en la región”. 
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activities including an extensive investigation on the environmental damages from the pilot 
plants, doing a baseline investigation, initiating research on creating processes with which to 
separate magnesium from lithium without the environmentally damaging consequences of 
'liming' and lastly, will have included a public consult (GNRE Memoria, 2012 in CEDLA B, 
2014: 100,101). However, in 2010 there was no actual environmental action plans (Ströbele-
Gregor, 2012: 51) and as of 2014 we have no knowledge of the existence of such plans. 
 
 
6.4. Inclusion, consultation and indigenous rights  
 
In this section we will explore how the political ambition of inclusion, participation and 
expanded rights is reflected in the lithium case. 
 
Adequately consulted as required in the constitution? 
Indigenous people in the areas of extraction have the constitutional right to be consulted before 
activities or policies that affect them and their communities are put into place (Constitution of 
Bolivia, article 30). On this point, as we have already seen, the new constitution complies with 
the rhetoric on participation and indigenous rights protection; but, moving to the actual 
implementation, in the case of lithium it is doubtful how extensive these consultations have been.  
According to the paper by Ströbele-Gregor (2012), some kind of consultation and public meeting 
about the lithium extraction has been conducted, but the participation of representatives from the 
local, rural communities has been very limited. Also the consultation was primarily about 
informing about the positive impacts of development and infrastructure and the participants were 
unanimously positive about the lithium extraction (Ibid.: 69). As mentioned earlier, a 
shortcoming of the consultation clause in the constitution and Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, 
is that it does not require consent from the local communities. In this case, however, a consent 
has been evident, but the question remains if it was obtained with sufficient participation and on 
adequately informed basis: 
 
"[...] There keep being open questions, concerning in what way the communities are informed 
about the ecological effects of the industrialisation of lithium, and especially concerning the 
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consequences for the water resource, so valuable in this region, and how it is perceived from a 
local point of view, that being the communities54" (Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 70).  
 
In addition, it can be questioned whether the consent was secured with involvement of the most 
affected rightholders. The farmers from the small rural communities are in many ways the ones 
that are most likely to be affected, and they have not had the chance to be heard (Ströbele-
Gregor, 2012: 69). Ströbele-Gregor (2012) claims that it is: "[...] doubtful whether they have 
been informed in detail about the consequences and the environmental costs of the programme of 
lithium55" (Ibid.: 81). Inhabitants of a small village close to Salar de Uyuni, Julaca, state that they 
were never informed of the potential environmental consequences:  
 
“He [a representative of COMIBOL] said, that life would flourish in our village, and that we 
would receive economic aid from the state, to create development. I asked him if the lithium-
extraction would harm our environment. He said, there wouldn’t be any impact whatsoever56” 
(IBIS, 2012).  
 
In 2013, CEDLA had done interviews with actors in the area, the local authorities and the 
Potosinian University Tomás Frías. According to these interviews, in general, the organisations 
are not very well informed about the GNRE project of industrialisation of lithium, the possible 
environmental damage or the GNRE’s ambitions to prevent this (CEDLA B, 2014: 108). Some, 
however, express certain concerns about the environmental impact, water usage and possible 
effect on tourism (Ibid.: 58; Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 71-72). 
 
Contrary to the knowledge about the negative socio-environmental impacts, a study also argues 
that citizens of Uyuni dream of the lithium project turning the town into a metropole with lots of 
jobs and a well-developed infrastructure (Ströbele-Gregor, 2013: 80). According to various 
studies, the consulted are in general positive and support the project on the basis, that it will 
bring jobs and economic development to the region and the Potosí area (CEDLA B, 2014: 108; 
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 Original quote: "...siguen siendo preguntas abiertas en que medida las comunidades estan informadas sobre los 
efectos ecologicos de la industrializacion del litio, especialmente sobre las consecuencias para el recurso agua, aqui 
tan valioso, y como esto es valorado desde el punto de vista local, es decir de las comunidades". 
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 Original quote: "Y es más que dudoso que hayan sido informadas con el debido detalle sobre las consecuencias y 
los costos ambientales del programa del litio". 
56
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Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 80). Ströbele-Gregor (2012, however, argues that this is mostly among 
organisations already connected in some way to the MAS government. In addition to the lack of 
adequate information, another reason for the locals’ excitement over the project could be that the 
actual impacts cannot yet be seen. The quinoa farmers have not experienced the direct 
consequences to the environment and especially to quinoa production from the lithium extraction 
industry, since the consequences have not manifested themselves yet. But according to CEDLA 
and others, these impacts will take place once the production reaches the expected levels.  
 
It seems doubtful whether COMIBOL’s activities can be seen as a compliance with the law of 
consultation, which feeds into the uncertainty revealed in chapter 4 regarding the limited degree 
of consultation; this uncertainty seems to have materialised in this case.  
 
Centralisation and exclusion of local interests 
The Civic Committee of Potosí57 (COMCIPO) has criticised the government for not being 
consulted and included in decision-making. In 2010, when the lithium project was initiated, 
COMCIPO launched a strike protesting against Bolivian Company of Evaporites58 (EBRE), the 
agency responsible for the extraction at that time, because COMCIPO was not consulted and 
because they were worried that the activities would not take local interests into consideration. 
 
"The problem is that the legal headquarters of the company will be in La Paz. Once again 
centralization continues and we, in accordance with the Constitution, ask that the headquarters 
will be in Potosí, specifically, at the site of production59" (COMCIPO in Que, 2010). 
 
COMCIPO was worried that the activities would not benefit the local community of Uyuni and 
Potosí. According to them EBRE represents: "[...] petty interests of persons and institutions from 
the capital with a shortsighted vision of centralism60"  (COMCIPO in Nacif, 2012). In line 
herewith, a farmer interviewed in the Ströbele-Gregor study notes, that “The lithium will 
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 Comité Civico Potosinista 
58
 La Empresa Boliviana de Recursos Evaporíticos 
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 Original quote: "La molestia es que la sede legal de funcionamiento de la empresa va a ser La Paz. Nuevamente se 
sigue centralizando y nosotros, conforme a lo que dice la Constitución, pedimos que la sede sea en Potosí, en 
concreto, en el lugar de producción". 
60
 Original quote: “intereses mezquinos de personas e instituciones de la capital con una corta visión de centralismo 
departamental”. 
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primarily benefit the politicians and the people from the capital of Potosí61” (Ströbele-Gregor, 
2012: 68). These testimonies are evidence of an urban privilege, an urbanisation of access to 
rights and services at the expense of rural inhabitants, and centralisation of service provision. 
Additionally the farmer expresses a perception of being neglected in favour of a continuation of 
favoritism towards urban populations, which is contradictory to Morales’ discourse on 
decentralising the government and include all Agambian people into his People.  
 
According to Ströbele-Gregor, the urban areas are in fact the ones standing to benefit most from 
the infrastructure investments and indirect effects of lithium production, while the rural 
populations are the ones that are going to face the negative consequences for their crops, animals 
and way of living (Ströbele-Gregor, 2012: 69). The rural inhabitants are the most vulnerable 
group as they rely to a very large degree on agriculture (especially quinoa), and who therefore 
are in risk of having their economic base destroyed, thus forcing them to migrate (CEDLA B, 
2014: 60). Even though the project of lithium extraction and its industrialisation stands to 
economically include some citizens that were not included before (from rural areas as well as 
from the towns of Potosí or Uyuni), it is creating an exclusion in the process of consulting and it 
is damaging the most vulnerable indigenous communities. 
 
These notions and the tendency to an urban privilege does not correlate with the National 
Development Plan’s ambition of a decentralised regional and municipal management and of 
delegating more power into the hands of social movements and indigenous communities. This 
becomes especially significant in a field of extraction of natural resources, where the potential 
impact on local communities and the environment is generally high.    
 
 
6.5 Sub-conclusion: the lithium project 
 
In this section, we have seen that the project of industrialising lithium has the potential of 
bringing significant economic development to the five municipalities surrounding Salar de Uyuni 
and to the Potosí department in general. This will be in the form of direct fiscal linkages of 
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 Original quote: “el litio beneficiará más a los políticos y los de la capital en Potosí”. 
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income, distributed to the local community, as well as construction of infrastructure such as 
paved roads, electricity, and potable water. The industrialisation will lead to a change in the 
economic structure of the region, strengthening the productive sector, thereby, making the region 
less dependent on primary commodities. It will also create direct as well as indirect employment 
in the different activities that will come as a result of the mining activity in the region. The direct 
employment is not only a linkage to the local economy but it also contains spillovers because 
local labour is being trained to hold more technical positions, and because technology is 
transferred to COMIBOL in the cooperation with Chinese and South-Korean companies. The 
extraction and industrialisation of lithium will create a different dynamic of labour because it can 
employ the free labour during the months in between harvesting and sowing of quinoa. This will 
bring a more stable income to the local population and it might also prevent migration from the 
region. 
 
On the other hand, there is a possibility that the extraction will create a severe environmental 
impact once the production reaches industrial levels. This could cause quinoa production to 
decline or even to disappear because of water shortage and pollution of the soil, which could 
have severe socio-economic consequences for the communities. According to the predictions, the 
economic benefits from the lithium outweighs the possible losses in quinoa production, but these 
are highly uncertain and depends on many different factors to succeed, including an expected 
development in the demand for lithium and the successfulness of GNRE to reach industrial scale 
production. It is also to be noted that if the usage of water for mining affect the availability of 
drinking water, this is in contradiction with both the constitution and the law on mining from 
2014. When looking at the constitutionally granted right for the local communities to be 
consulted it seems that the government and COMIBOL have not adequately lived up to this; 
thereby not living up to their commitment to inclusive citizenship and acknowledgement of 
minority rights with special emphasis on the indigenous populations’ right to consultation. Also, 
the local population and organisations are not fully aware of, or not troubled by, the possible 
environmental damages, but instead they dream of the region developing into a lively area with 
jobs, health facilities, schools, transportation and a steady flow of ion batteries.  
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7. Concluding discussion 
 
A discourse of inclusion and synergy between economic development and indigenous and 
nature rights 
 
In our analysis of the trade-off between pursuing economic growth based on natural resource 
exploitation and protecting indigenous and nature rights, we have examined three levels of 
expressions of the Bolivian development model; discursive, legislative and practical 
implementation.  
 
When looking at the discursive level of the development model, we see, that neither the 
discourse of Morales, nor the Constitution or the National Development Plan clearly express a 
trade-off between using natural resources as a driver of economic growth and at the same time 
ensuring the rights of indigenous groups as well as the nature they are depending on. One 
discourse of Morales promotes political rights and group-based citizenship, thereby including the 
formerly marginalised indigenous groups into the Bolivian People. Another discourse 
emphasizes natural resources as the mean of achieving economic growth and equality. 
 
When turning to the legislative part of the development model, we find that there actually is a 
trade-off at this level. In the new mining law of 2014, natural resources are constructed as an 
asset of strategic importance for the nation, thereby, putting extraction of resources before the 
protection of Pachamama, indigenous peoples’ right to land, resources and other productive 
activities such as agriculture.   
 
Economic development at the cost of the environment 
The environmental impacts in the two cases have been difficult to assess because many of them 
have not yet been (fully) realised. They are also difficult to investigate because there is 
contradictory evidence, often related to actors with conflicting interests. However, it seems clear 
that both operations have had, and will have severe effects on the environment and on the 
indigenous populations inhabiting the areas, especially those relying on the lands for agricultural 
use. Both operations use immense amounts of water, with the potential of causing droughts in 
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what is already one of the driest areas of Bolivia, heavily affecting irrigation of crops and 
additionally, as some studies show, the quality of accessible drinking water. In comparison, in 
the production of lithium the estimated water usage will be 420,000 cubic meters per month, 
whereas the actual consumption of MSC is around 1.5 million cubic meters per month - more 
than thrice as much. We have less conclusive data on contamination, but, nevertheless, we find it 
within our purview to conclude, based on the extensive water consumption, that the fragile 
ecosystem in the area is endangered. If the MSC and the lithium operations have damaged the 
drinking water, the state has in fact failed to intervene and enforce the law. But we recognise the 
difficulty of assessing this impact and therefore the background for potential state intervention. 
MSC denies that the water they use has an impact on the water resources for people, animals and 
irrigation, since it is not fit for consumption by living organisms. Also, Echazú, the leader of 
GNRE, rejects that the environmental damage of lithium extraction will be as big as the CEDLA 
investigation predicts.  
 
MSC has several practical strategies in their environmental management system; it reports to the 
Bolivian government in accordance with Bolivian law and has a very vocal environmental, 
image to care for. GNRE in the lithium case seems to have good intentions and potentially great 
prospects concerning respect for national and local environmental regulations. We have, 
however, not been able to find any actual action plans for managing environmental damages. 
Moreover, because of the lacking or limited amount of consultation and information 
dissemination to the population, the populaces and CSO’s are not made aware of the 
environmental regulations and are therefore not able to hold them accountable, as the 
governmental vision prescribes, as new, self-governing, participatory citizens. The regulative 
control mechanisms and legislative enforcement in both cases might be rather weak, but in the 
lithium case the potential of creating far-reaching and ambitious measures, however, exist for 
minimising the inevitable environmental damages from mining due to the political ambitions 
behind the operations. The environmental damages in both cases show that the praiseworthy 
ambition of the state to extract resources in a sustainable manner is highly troublesome and 
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contradicted in the analysis: “The natural resources have positive externalities, which generate 
revenue and development, if they are extracted in a sustainable manner62” (PND 2006: 92). 
 
The end as a mean - flawed public consult and participation 
As such, neither of the case studies in this project represent a holistic development model where 
the protection of the rights of Pachamama go together with economic development. The 
processes, that the Morales government promised to deliver, both on the rhetorical and 
legislative level, encompassing comprehensive consultation, participation in decision-making, 
transparency and inclusion of excluded minorities, are being compromised in favour of the goal - 
the ambition of socio-economic development for all. Both the constitution, and to a lesser extent 
the mining law, apply measures to confront this possible trade-off; that is, mitigation and 
prevention of incidental environmental damage and the concept of free and informed public 
consult. These measures, however, are challenged.  
 
In the case of lithium, the consent from local communities in the consultation process was 
secured on an inadequate basis, as several affected actors had not been included or informed 
adequately, thus, limiting their opportunities to participate and influence. Another reason could 
be that they accept the trade-off and the concomitant change in their way of life (for the rural 
people) by prioritising the development benefits. The trade-off in the sense of receiving more 
jobs, roads and schools to the area, on the expense of negative consequences such as possible 
damage to the environment, agricultural production and drinking water. In addition, the 
constitutionalised and rhetorically promised decentralisation of participation and inclusion has 
not been secured, as the rural inhabitants, who stand to suffer the greatest damage, also suffer 
from a certain centralisation of benefits. This also captures an important aspect of this challenge; 
there is an unequal distribution of impacts and benefits; the ones who suffer the biggest impact of 
extraction are conversely not the ones who receive the biggest benefits.  
 
An additional noteworthy contradictory practical restriction to the ambition of active community 
participation, is the new mining law’s criminalisation of demonstrations against mining. A 
restriction of which we have yet to see the consequences of. This alludes to Morales’ rhetorical 
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 Original quote: “Los recursos naturales presentan externalidades positivas que generan por su existencia ingresos 
y desarrollo si son aprovechados de manera sostenible”. 
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construction of a participatory state, which only in praxis is participatory and supports communal 
pressure, when it is in support of him and the government.  
 
When Morales’ administration prioritises the national socio-economic development and not the 
processes of social inclusion, he excludes the Agambian people he claims to represent. This 
means that the exploitation of resources, for the use of benefitting Morales’ new production of an 
all-inclusive Bolivian People, comes at the expense of the concept Vivir bien and indigenous 
citizenship; concepts that are so strongly emphasised in the communitarian discourse of Morales, 
the constitution, The National Development Plan and The Law of the Rights of Mother Earth.  
 
The discourse of community is one of Morales’ discursive technologies of power in his inclusive 
democratic citizenship. We see, in his governmentalised communitarianism, a reciprocal action 
between using the discourse of community as a means of communities’ empowerment (the 
practical side of the discourse) and as a tool to legitimise his politics and exercise power, as 
explained by Delanty.  
 
Compromised cultural rights and Vivir bien  
The potentially most serious socio-environmental consequence seems to be in regard to the 
quinoa production in and around Salar de Uyuni that makes up a large part of the local economy 
and socio-cultural organisation. As we have shown, the inhabitants of San Cristóbal have been 
forced to move, creating more distance to farmland and livestock and in the region around the 
lithium plant, farmers have been affected by the scarcity of water. Where the income from 
lithium yet remains uncertain, it stands to destroy the current income from quinoa production; a 
production which has been rapidly increasing nationally over recent years and is employing most 
of the regions rural inhabitants - around half of the total population of the five municipalities 
surrounding the desert. A consequence for the indigenous people in the area is, that they will 
need to migrate to cities or neighbouring countries in search for jobs. We consider the 
environmental damage and lack of opportunities for agriculture and breeding of livestock, which 
are traditional livelihoods, as a loss of or change to indigenous culture and community. Hence, in 
our cases, local consequences of Morales’ development model clash with the discourse of 
recognition of cultural and minority rights by privileging indigenous knowledge, belief systems 
87 
 
and organisation. In both cases, we have encountered instances of local objections against the 
shortcomings of Morales’ development model, manifested in demonstrations for more state 
intervention against the environmental erosion and lack of inclusion, information, consultation, 
and distribution of wealth. 
 
In either cases, we see a tendency of social movements and civil society buying into Morales’ 
contradictory mix of discourses of both nationalisation of natural resources, equal redistribution 
of revenues from mining and simultaneously respect for Pachamama. They, thereby, rearticulate 
the discourses of Morales’ entanglement of indigenist and socialist ideologies. In the lithium case 
some of the consulted communities prioritise the prospect of jobs and service provision at the 
expense of the environment and traditional social organisation. In San Cristóbal, a number of 
CSO’s decry capitalism and private companies’ exploitation of nature, but not necessarily if the 
exploitation of natural resources is nationalised and the revenues are distributed according to 
socialist ideals. It then becomes evident that environmental rights are neither necessarily 
corresponding nor compatible with indigenous, and a trade-off or a prioritisation seems to be 
negotiated between the two forms of rights.  
 
State-owned vs. private companies and their developmental contribution 
 
Based on the above assessment it is clear that there is in fact a trade-off between economic 
growth through mining on the one hand, and environmental protection and indigenous inclusion 
on the other hand. The most significant difference in a comparison between the cases is, that one 
is purely state-owned and the other, purely foreign and privately owned; a case of national 
industrialisation versus a case of primary commodity export. The aspects of environmental 
damage and the concomitant possible negative impacts on indigenous communities relying on 
agriculture, are in many ways similar in the two cases. Since they are located geographically so 
close to each other, the environmental consequences are difficult to separate from each other. In 
the economic indicators we however find great differences on the national-private parameter. In 
the case of the state-owned lithium project we find, that it has the potential of creating a much 
larger economic contribution to the state both in relative (the portion of revenues from lithium) 
and in absolute numbers. Additionally, it has greater potential of creating learning processes both 
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at the local and especially national level than that of the private case of silver mining in San 
Cristóbal.  
 
The ambition of Morales is that Bolivia shall be more than an exporter of primary commodities. 
Bolivia shall industrialise, diversify its economy, and create added value. According to 
conventional economic development theory, creating linkages and strengthening the industrial 
sector is the way towards creating viable and sustainable economic development benefitting the 
whole of society. The case of industrialising lithium has the potential of carrying out this 
ambition.  
 
The government’s relatively weak legislative enforcement leaves room for MSC to export almost 
their entire production, have very few linkages to the local economy, even fewer spillovers and 
paying “only” 5% in royalties and even less in corporate tax. On the other hand, the lithium 
project has the potential to pay up to 45% in royalties and corporate tax, create more and deeper 
linkages and generate knowledge spillovers.  
  
The political interest in creating linkages 
Even though the MSC employs a significant number of workers, it is relatively small compared 
to the size of its profit, which complies with the theoretical argument of extraction being very 
capital-intensive and labour-scarce. With the lithium case’s expected direct employment of 1,000 
direct and 4,000 indirect workers, it is hard to separate the lithium-case from the 2,000 workers 
directly employed by MSC. The difference is, that where MSC is creating shallow linkages the 
lithium project is going to create very deep linkages by industrialising the commodity, adding 
value to the product and creating better spillovers. Also, the investment will lead to a product 
(batteries) that is likely to be less volatile than commodity prices, thus diversifying the economy 
and protecting it from external price shocks. This can be done, because the lithium project is 
state controlled and because there is a political will to do this. In this sense, the case of 
industrialising lithium is an example of political linkage development. Since the state controls 
the lithium extraction it is also a political decision to industrialise it, by domestically producing 
lithium-ion batteries. It is of symbolic importance for the construction of the new Bolivian 
national citizenship that the industrialisation of the valuable resource is purely state controlled.  
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Had legislative measures on linkage development been imposed upon San Cristóbal, creating 
production linkages and thereby ensuring local spillovers of technology and upgrading the 
workforce, the positive economic benefit for the region could have been much larger. Instead, 
the department of Potosí is highly dependent on rents from the mine and therefore dependent on 
international mineral prices. When the San Cristóbal mine is allegedly emptied in just nine years 
from now, it will leave the local population with potentially severe environmental damage, dried-
up water resources and worsened opportunities to return to the agricultural activities that 
sustained them before the mine. This is because the mine is not contributing to the productive 
sector and only provides rents and basic infrastructure. In this sense, MSC is an enclave activity, 
that does not foster activity in the productive sector but resembles a classic example of capitalist 
profit-seeking enterprises. Furthermore, it seems, that a foreign direct investment operation such 
as San Cristóbal epitomises the immanent arbitrariness of “which communities develop and 
which do not?” It becomes a matter of coincidence, whether one community is “lucky” enough 
to be situated on top of a resource reserve and thus gets to be relocated to better conditions. This 
plays into Buur et al.’s concept of enclave activities being prone to amplify inequalities, in this 
case also between local communities. Therefore, the perceived inequality experienced is not just 
based on the contrasting difference between the foreign entity, pulling money out of the country, 
and the locals, but on an even more tangible and obvious inequality amidst locals.       
 
The state has, in the lithium case, the possibility and total control to fulfill and implement its own 
legislative and rhetorical discourse - to do an extensive consult of indigenous communities, and 
take actions to prevent environmental damage. This is both in its own interest as well as its state-
responsibility. Therefore it is noticeable, that this has not been done fully. In the San Cristóbal 
case, MSC is, as it is privately owned, basically ruled by capitalist interests and profit 
orientation. The Bolivian state is therefore split between an economic interest in keeping MSC in 
the country in order to collect rent, and a legislative responsibility and duty to enforce its own 
laws and impose surveillance and regulations upon MSC. This is also reflected in the up until 
now unseen changes in MSC’s contractual conditions as it is so far exempt of the legislative 
enforcement of the new mining law, which does not reflect the government’s ambitions of 
achieving greater imposition and influence over the mining industry.  
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The dangers of rent-seeking 
While mining will undeniably damage nature, as both cases have shown, resource-rich countries 
have a choice to make regarding the extraction of their resources. The examples shown by the 
two cases in this project shed light on the alternative paths countries can take towards 
development using income from the extractive industry. 
 
On the one hand, we have an example of rent-seeking behaviour and on the other, an example of 
a project that is trying to achieve sustainable development through industrialisation. We can see 
that a purely rent-seeking behaviour, reflected in the example of San Cristóbal, offers little to the 
country in the long-term. The revenue, that the state receives from rent-seeking is very small 
compared to what can be achieved economically and non-monetarily through linkage creation 
and spillovers. On the other hand, industrialisation requires investments and planning that, if 
things go according to plan, could help achieve a more sustainable development. However, in 
our cases, for such development to occur, sacrifices have to be made to the people, in the shape 
of exclusion of certain groups, and to the environment. In this specific context of lithium mining 
in Salar de Uyuni, the question then becomes of where to place priority; on the people of the 
region and their rights or the possible development of the country for a raised standard of living 
for a greater number of People in the country? 
 
Achieving growth through the act of collecting rent, as in the case of San Cristóbal, is not 
sustainable and alludes to the traits and pitfalls of a rent-seeking state. The lithium case 
demonstrates, however, a more sustainable mean of achieving economic growth; industrialisation 
and diversification of the economy, with greater linkage-depth and the concomitant benefits of 
manufacturing, employment, infrastructure, etc. The process in which the lithium project has 
been executed so far is however non-transparent and excluding, which has happened at the 
expense of the local people, who the Morales government claim to represent, but for the benefit 
of the People. Conversely, San Cristóbal in many ways signifies a remnant of a neoliberal past 
due to its considerably free reins regarding exploitation of water and export of profits as well as 
primary commodities to be processed elsewhere. With the new mining law, the state has been 
provided with wider legislative tools in monitoring and regulating the mining operations in the 
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country, thus there exists a potential for the government to force mining operations to create 
more linkages. The effects of, or rather actions taken on the basis of, these possibilities have yet 
to be seen. 
 
The lithium case, however, does present promising development prospects especially in contrast 
to San Cristóbal, whose temporary existence in the area, does not leave much for future 
development.    
 
The trade-off 
The analysis of our two cases shows that the strategy of creating a new citizenship with inclusion 
of indigenous philosophy and simultaneously creating economic growth through mining is on the 
expense of the most vulnerable: the people. We have seen that the development has come at the 
cost of the constructed all-inclusive citizenship and the extraordinary rights of Pachamama, at 
least within this project’s field of research. It is however outside the scope of this project to 
assess Morales and the government’s success in providing equality, participation and inclusion 
featured in their admirable social, economic and cultural developmental model in other areas 
than mining.  
 
In the 6 years preceding Morales’ inauguration, Bolivia’s GPD increased from 8.3 billion USD 
in 1999 to 9.5 billion USD in 2005 (14.5% increase). After Morales took office, the GDP 
increased from 11.4 billion USD in 2006 to 27 billion USD in 2012 (137% increase) (INE, 
2014). Furthermore, income from mining has increased from an annual average of 16 million 
USD (1999-2005) to 201 million USD (2006-2012) (Ministerio de Mineria Metalurgia, Informe 
de Gestion 2012: 59). As depicted in section 4.3, when comparing the goals of the National 
Development Plan with actual progress, this shows that the overall increase in growth has, to a 
large extent, been used to create social improvements, especially for the poor groups of the 
country. We have seen a decrease in poverty and inequality, while health care expenditures have 
as much as tripled. Both the rhetoric and the economic policy of the government have addressed 
the problems of the poor people of Bolivia and has (economically) managed to include them. We 
assess, on the basis of this research’s results, that the Morales government has succeeded in 
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creating economic development for the Bolivian People, through his socialist construction of 
minerals as a strategic national resource.  
 
To return to our problem formulation - this project shows with great clarity that there is an 
ambiguity and great difficulty in politically promising both the progressive and far-reaching 
environmental rights as Morales has done, while relying on the natures’ resources to generate 
growth.  
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